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CHAPTER1
Introduction
When I started the endeavor of pursuing a Ph.D. in summer 2012, the financial
sector was in a state of despair: the financial crisis had already shed havoc on most
developed countries’ banking industries and, in the Euro Area periphery, the
vicious circle of bank bailouts and government debt was at full throttle. How had it
come this far?
One has to dig deep to find the roots in a region of the financial system that
was, before the year 2007, mostly known for its ever increasing returns and payroll
bills: the shadow banking sector. The name is owed to the fact that, in contrast to
traditional banks, which live in the light of government’s regulatory torch, the
shadow sector lives in the shades, being mostly unaffected by regulators’ scrutiny.1
The innovation that jumped-started shadow banking activities in the 1970s was
securitization in the mortgage and credit card market, a cascade of financial
transactions within the shadow system that (seemingly) transformed risky loans
into substitutes for safe government bonds. While securitization was successful in
diversifying idiosyncratic borrower risk through pooling and tranching of loans, it
turned out to be susceptible to aggregate risk. When house prices in the US started
to fall in early 2007, for the first time since the 1970s, default rates in the entire
mortgage market rose. Especially subprime borrowers, with low equity and low
income, defaulted on their mortgages as teaser rates expired and their houses came
under water. The systemic default of the underlying mortgages, an event that was
ex ante deemed by risk models as very low probability, triggered the default of
entire loan pools; also of those considered as relatively safe due to a high credit
rating. Relying on these ratings and not fully understanding the risks attached, a
lot of institutions had either bought stakes in these low quality loan pools (e.g.
pension funds) or sold credit default swaps on them (e.g. investment banks). These
1I use the term ’shadow banking system’ because it seems to have been absorbed into public
vocabulary. However, I believe that his negative connotation neglects positive features such as
increases in financial market depth, efficiency and resilience. I therefore prefer the name ’parallel
banking system’.
1
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institutions suffered huge losses when subprime loans started to default and credit
events were triggered. With strong interlinkages between the traditional and
shadow banking sector, the subprime crisis quickly spilled over to commercial
banks. Banks were confronted with unexpected losses and recourse transfers from
their off-balance-sheet conduits. The subsequent reduction in risk-bearing capacity
put banks under stress and induced credit squeezes, which amplified the already
adverse economic conditions, and government bail-outs.
The shock, born within the financial sector, sent growth rates and inflation
around the world tumbling in a magnitude that was only surmount by the Great
Depression. In an unprecedented effort central banks tried to end the recession by
lowering interest rates to new record lows, but without much success. Soon, the
ammunition of conventional monetary policy was exhausted as nominal policy rates
hit the zero lower bound.
The issues This chain of events reveals one fact: the business cycle has not
been tamed. Available policy tools did neither suffice to foresee the build–up of
systemic risk in the financial sector, nor did they suffice for a fast and efficient
containment of the ensuing turmoil in the real economy.
This thesis focuses on two issues: First, when, in the wake of the financial
crisis, conventional monetary policy ran out of ammunition, central banks
increasingly relied on unconventional, and sometimes controversial, policy
measures, such as forward guidance. The empirical evidence on the effectiveness of
forward guidance is mixed (see for example Filardo and Hofmann, 2014). It
crucially depends on central banks’ credible commitment to keep policy rates low,
even if future macroeconomic conditions warrant a tighter monetary stance
(Eggertsson and Woodford, 2003). This is especially a concern under widely
adopted inflation targeting, as central banks target the change in the price level,
not the price level itself. Policy rates are thus expected to be raised, even if the
pre-crisis price level has not been reached. This can attenuate forward guidance
effectiveness, if longer-term inflationary expectations remain anchored at the
inflation target. One prominent suggestion to attenuate this issue is to change the
modus operandi of central banks from inflation to price level targeting. Under a
price level target, expectations are anchored at the level and not at the growth
rate, such that longer-term inflationary expectations increase the more the price
level falls below target.
Second, the regulatory framework for commercial banks, established under the
Basel I and II Accords, fell short in encouraging banks to accumulate sufficient
risk–bearing capacity to absorb the losses triggered by shadow market and
interbank risk exposures. Banks’ capital adequacy is, most of the times, evaluated
2
using models that extrapolate from observed conditions. Since the systemic risk
build-up at the onset of the financial crisis was to a large extend driven by
innovations to the securitization technology that, up to this point, had been
working smoothly and were deemed to be low risk, looking at the past did not
generate enough informational content to price the risk of mortgage- and asset-back
securities appropriately. As a result, regulators could not properly assess banks’
risk exposures and enforce sufficient capitalizations. One possibility to attenuate
this issue is to augment the current regulatory framework with a structural
perspective. A structural framework allows regulators to conduct forward-looking
policy counterfactuals, with dynamics that are to a lesser extend driven by
observed conditions, but by expectations of forward-looking, optimizing agents.
Key contributions This thesis is a product of its time. It tries to
contribute to an understanding of how policy can improve financial crises
management, both from an ex ante and ex post point of view. From this
perspective, the main contributions of this thesis are twofold:
First, ex post, it adds to unconventional monetary policy design, once financial
market turmoil has spilled over to the real economy and the zero lower bound is
binding. Several scholars suggested that a price level target, instead of an inflation
target, can attenuate the issue of credible commitment to forward guidance
announcements. A level target necessarily implies higher inflation rates during the
catch-up period, which makes the commitment to low policy rates for are prolonged
period part of the policy goal. Chapter 2 studies optimal forward guidance in a
traceable, three-period model of price-level targeting. It digresses from canonical,
Calvo-pricing induced, inflation targeting and features price-level targeting as
endogenous welfare-optimal policy. The result will be that price-level targeting is
no universal remedy to the issues of forward guidance. While discretionary policy
indeed benefits from an automatic stabilization mechanism (relative to an inflation
target), optimal commitment suffers from a credibility problem also under a level
target. The amount of pledgeable future overshooting is constrained by
deflationary pressure that arises when the price level returns down to target. This
constraint is absent under an inflation target, as overshooting the target does not
necessarily trigger deflationary expectations. The chapter also contributes to the
policy discussion of optimal fiscal policy at the zero lower bound. It shows that
forward guidance is optimally supported by front-loaded government spending,
while pro-cyclical spending fares even worse than a discretionary fiscal policy.
Second, ex ante, this thesis adds to the advancement of a structural approach
to banking regulation. By rooting default probabilities on first principals, instead
of exogenous assumption and historical distributions, this approach accounts for
3
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the Lucas critique and widens the scope of analysis to counterfactual policy
experiments. Chapter 3 develops a methodology for microprudential stress testing
that is, in contrast to the state-of-the-art approach, not based on correlations
extrapolated to tail events, but generates stress projections rooted on optimal
behavior of rational, forward-looking banks. Crucially, this approach enables to
consider stress scenarios that feature counterfactual regulatory parameters, like
risk-weights or minimum capital requirements, which have not been in place yet or
only for too short time periods, such that no reliable correlation can be measured.
It thereby contributes to robust stress testing, since, for example, the effect of an
(intended) recapitalization on bank stability, vis-a`-vis a stress scenario, can be
analyzed, accounting as well for changes in non-stress behavior of the bank.
Along the same line, Chapter 4 contributes to the discussion about the
optimal level of capital requirements, through the lens of a structural framework. It
adds to this strand of literature by explicitly accounting for banks’ ability to
engage in regulatory arbitrage to evade regulatory pressure. The bank uses
recourse sales to a secondary market for bank-originated loans to reduce
risk-weighted assets against which regulatory capital has to be held. Crucially,
these sales reduce bank’s exposure to idiosyncratic credit risk but expose it to the
possibility of systemic secondary market distress. In this setup, the effect of capital
regulation on bank stability is non-monotonic. For sufficiently low capital
requirements, the correlation between regulatory tightness and bank stability is
positive. However, for a sufficiently high requirement, the bank engages in evasive
behavior by shifting a large fraction of its loan portfolio off-balance-sheet. The
corresponding reduction in risk-weighted assets allows the bank to reduce its equity
cushion and thus its risk-bearing capacity, despite a larger exposure to secondary
market risk. The quantitative results will be suggestive for the view that the upper
bound of accumulated capital requirements, suggested under Basel III, lies close to
this evasive region. There, the trade-off between idiosyncratic and systemic risk
exposure is relevant for regulators as the economic costs of over-regulating can be
sizable, as the chapter will show.
Structure of the thesis Part I, Chapter 2 (adapted from Illing and
Siemsen, 2016) of this thesis deals with optimal forward guidance in a model with
price-level targeting. A version of this chapter is published in CESifo Economic
Studies, 62(1), 47-67. Part II, Chapter 3 (adapted from Corbae, D’Erasmo,
Galaasen, Irarrazabal, and Siemsen, 2015) lays out the structural model for stress
testing and Chapter 4 (adapted from Siemsen, 2016) studies optimal capital
regulation in a model with regulatory arbitrage.
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Part I
The Macroeconomic Consequences of
Financial Market Disruptions and
Policy Responses
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CHAPTER2
Forward Guidance at the Zero Lower
Bound in a Model of Price-Level Targeting
Being of no power to make his wishes good:
His promises fly so beyond his state
That what he speaks is all in debt; he owes
For every word.
– William Shakespeare
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CHAPTER 2. FORWARD GUIDANCE AT THE ZERO LOWER BOUND IN A
MODEL OF PRICE-LEVEL TARGETING
2.1 Introduction
With policy rates at close to zero worldwide, central banks in the USA,
England, Japan and the Euro Area increasingly resorted to forward guidance
(signaling their intention to keep interest rates low for an extended period) as a
tool to lower the real rate of interest and to stimulate real activity even when the
nominal rate is stuck at the zero lower bound (ZLB). Current central bank policy
has been strongly influenced by recent research on optimal policy at the ZLB in
New Keynesian models (e.g. Eggertsson and Woodford, 2003; Eggertsson, 2011;
Werning, 2012). These models allow analyzing the impact of price stickiness, but
they focus almost exclusively on the special case of a Calvo (1983) pricing
mechanism.
As is well known, targeting an inflation rate of zero is welfare optimizing in
that setting. At the ZLB, it is optimal to commit to target a higher rate of
inflation for some time once the ZLB is no longer binding. But as shown by
Eggertsson and Woodford (2003), optimal policy under forward guidance is prone
to a problem of dynamic inconsistency. Recently, price level targeting has been
suggested as a strategy to overcome this problem: under price level targeting,
periods of undershooting the target are automatically followed by catching up
periods of higher inflation in order to return to target, introducing an automatic
stabilization mechanism.1
This chapter analyses price–level targeting in a traceable three–period setup.
Extending the framework of Benigno (2009), we characterize monetary and fiscal
forward–guidance policy in a model, in which price–level targeting emerges
endogenously as welfare–optimal policy through the welfare function. To this end,
we deviate from the Calvo assumption and assume that firms are ex–ante
heterogeneous: a share of firms exhibit long–run price stickiness over the whole
model horizon. Nevertheless, in such a regime, similar issues arise as under
inflation targeting: it is optimal to commit to a higher price level for some time
once the ZLB will no longer be binding. However, unlike inflation targeting, a
price–level target constrains the credible amount of overshooting through
deflationary expectations when returning to target. So it may be optimal to
commit to holding nominal rates at zero for an extended period even after the
shock has abated. Again, optimal policy is not time consistent.
Under discretion, price–level targeting works indeed as automatic stabilization
mechanism in the sense that it alleviates the ”paradox of flexibility”. Under
inflation targeting, more flexible prices amplify contemporaneous deflation for a
1For a recent survey see Hatcher and Minford (2014).
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given contractionary shock. As shown in Werning (2012), discretionary welfare loss
is lowest with completely rigid prices. In contrast, price–level targeting mitigates
output shortfalls, during a deflationary liquidity trap, by raising inflationary
expectations under discretion. In this regime, stronger contemporaneous deflation,
due to more flexible prices, further increases inflationary expectations as long as
long–run price expectations remain anchored. This decreases the real rate and
stimulates consumption. We show that discretionary welfare loss is lowest with
fully flexible prices. However, the effect of price rigidities on welfare may be
non-monotonic: for large enough price stickiness, relaxing price stickiness
marginally, may lead to higher welfare losses.
Characterizing optimal commitment policy, successful forward guidance
depends on the credibility of ”irresponsible” monetary easing (Krugman, 1998).
We show that under price–level targeting a new constraint emerges that may
restrain optimal commitment. Similar to inflation targeting, it is optimal to
commit to excess inflation. However, we show that under price–level targeting, the
credible amount of future overshooting that the central bank can announce, is
constrained by the ZLB even after the shock has abated. The reason is
straightforward: periods of overshooting need to be followed by deflation to return
to target. The stronger the overshooting, the larger the degree of deflation required
later, driving the nominal policy rate possibly again to the ZLB. So the central
bank may find it optimal to hold the nominal rate at zero for an extended period
while postponing the return to the price level–target.
Recently, Cochrane (2013) argued that –due to nominal indeterminacy under
inflation targeting– the New Keynesian framework exhibits multiple equilibria with
different price paths, some of them with mild inflation and no output loss during a
liquidity trap. We characterize the optimal price path under price–level targeting
and show that price stickiness eliminates price–level indeterminacy under optimal
policy.
Finally, we introduce government spending as additional policy tool. We show
that, similar to inflation targeting, with price–level targeting, a countercyclical
impact reaction of fiscal spending is optimal, both under discretion and
commitment. When policy rates are zero for an extended period of time,
government spending should become more front–loaded. However, since fiscal
spending affects nominal rates through marginal utility, the credibility of an
announced government spending path might be constrained by the ZLB even after
the adverse shock fully abated. Finally, we show that procyclical fiscal policy
always results in welfare losses that are even higher than under discretionary policy.
9
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2.2 Baseline model
We consider a discrete time, three-period setup with t ∈ [1, 2, 3]. The
households’ optimization problem is given by
max
{Ct,Nt}3t=1
E1
[
3∑
t=1
(t−1∏
j=1
1
1 + ρj
)(C1− 1σt
1− 1
σ
− N
1+ϕ
t
1 + ϕ
)]
s.t.
P1C1 +B1 = W1N1 + T1
P2C2 +B2 = W2N2 + (1 + i
S
1 )B1 + T2
P3C3 = W3N3 + (1 + i
S
2 )B2 + T3
where ρj is the stochastic discount rate, σ is the elasticity of inter-temporal
substitution, ϕ characterizes the elasticity of labor supply, Ct is real consumption,
Nt are hours worked and Pt is the price level. Households save via the purchase of
short-term (one period) nominal bonds, Bt, which yield interest i
S
t . Wt is the
nominal wage rate and Tt are nominal lump–sum net transfers including firms’
profits and lump–sum taxes. It is straightforward to derive the log-linear
aggregate-demand curves through the Euler equation and market clearing
condition:
yt − y? = Et[yt+1 − y?]− σ
(
iSt − [E[pt+1]− pt]− ρt
)
, t ∈ {1, 2} (2.1)
where yt ≡ log Yt, pt ≡ logPt and y? denoting the efficient (log–)level of production.
Firms have mass one. Imposing the standard Calvo (1983) assumption induces
inflation targeting as welfare–optimal policy. To see this, consider a Calvo
mechanism in our three-period setup. Without loss of generality, assume that in
period 0 the economy is in steady state and price dispersion is zero, such that the
aggregate price level p0 equals the idiosyncratically optimal price level p
?
0. In period
1 an exogenous shock shifts the idiosyncratically optimal price level to p?1 6= p?0. Let
Γ ∈ (0, 1) denote the Calvo probability that a firm is able to just prices. Then,
coming from a steady state, in period 1 the aggregate price level is given by
p1 = (1− Γ)p?0 + Γp?1. The central bank, which can control aggregate demand
perfectly, is concerned with welfare–detrimental idiosyncratic price dispersion
resulting in inefficient labor allocation. In period 2 the central bank’s problem
therefore is to minimize price dispersion by setting p?2 optimally. Given the Calvo
assumption, in period 2 the mass of firms charging p?0 isM0 = (1− Γ)2, the mass of
10
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firms charging p?1 is M1 = Γ(1− Γ) and the mass of firms that will be charging p?2
is M2 = Γ2 + (1− Γ)Γ = Γ. Therefore, the aggregate price level in period 2 is
p2 =M0p?0 +M1p?1 +M2p?2. Idiosyncratic price dispersion is given by
D2 = vari(p2(i)) =
∑2
t=0Mt[p?t − pt]2. Minimizing D2 by choosing p?2 implies
p?2 = p1 and given the Calvo inflation process it follows that p2 = p1, such that
pi2 = 0. It is straightforward to apply this argument to any period t. Therefore,
with Calvo mechanism, minimizing idiosyncratic price dispersion induces an
aggregate inflation target of zero.
The intuition for this result is as follows: with Calvo–pricing firms are
homogeneous ex–ante (before it is exogenously determined which firms can adjust
prices). Therefore, in response to an exogenous shock, all firms want to adjust to
the same new optimal price. In that sense, the adjusting firms are representative
for idiosyncratic optimal behavior of all firms. Consequently, with Calvo–pricing,
inflation is a perfect signal of idiosyncratic price distortions, because inflation only
occurs if the adjusting firms find a new price level optimal.2 But as the
non–adjusting firms find the same price level optimal, it necessarily follows that
these firm cannot behave optimally and price distortions emerge. Therefore, with
Calvo–pricing, targeting a zero rate of inflation emerges as the natural strategy for
a central bank that is concerned with minimizing price distortions.
To modify the framework such that price–level targeting emerges endogenously
as welfare–optimal policy, we do not impose a Calvo mechanism, but allow firms to
be ex–ante heterogeneous. In particular, a share α1 exhibits long–run price
stickiness and a share α2 exhibits short–run price stickiness. Assume that in the
past (call it period 0), the economy has been in steady state such that all firms
charged the same price p?. α1–type firms have long–run sticky prices in the sense
that they cannot deviate from p? in periods 1, 2 and, with probability λ, also not in
period 3. The parameter λ allows us to vary the degree of long–run rigidity in
period 3 independent of rigidities in the other periods. A share α2 of firms exhibits
short–run price stickiness, because they cannot deviate from p? only in period 1,
but can adjust freely from then on. The remaining 1− (α1 + α2) firms can adjust
their prices freely also in period 1. In contrast to Calvo pricing, where both
short–run and long–run stickiness are controlled by the Calvo–parameter only, this
pricing scheme allows us to elaborate on the (potentially asymmetric) effects of
short–run and long–run price stickiness on optimal monetary policy commitment.3
Firms’ production technology is homogeneous and given by
Yt(i) = ANt(i), ∀i ∈ [0, 1], where A is a productivity constant. The good market is
2Only with perfectly flexible prices, inflation is no signal for price distortions.
3Using a three–period model keeps this price scheme analytically traceable, as it limits the
accumulation of price dispersion over time.
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monopolistic competitive such that Yt(i) = (Pt(i)/Pt)
−θYt with θ being the
elasticity of substitution between a continuum of goods. Given our pricing scheme
aggregate (log-) supply can be derived as
pt − p? = κt[yt − y?], t ∈ {1, 2, 3} (2.2)
where κ1 =
1−α1−α2
α1+α2
( 1
σ
+ ϕ), κ2 =
1−α1
α1
( 1
σ
+ ϕ) and κ3 =
1−α1λ
α1λ
( 1
σ
+ ϕ). Since
limα1→0 κ2 = limα1→0 κ3 = +∞ but limα1→0 κ1 6= +∞ there will be no output gaps
in period 2 and 3 if long–run price rigidity is zero. In period 1, however, an output
gap emerges independently of α1 since also the α2–type firms have their period 1
prices set to p? (short–term price rigidity). By construction, once some new firms
are allowed to optimize freely under our pricing scheme (α2 in period 2, (1− λ)α1
in period 3), they know that they are free to adjust from then on for all remaining
periods. Therefore, unlike with a Calvo mechanism, when optimizing, firms do not
need to internalize that they may not be allowed to re–optimize in the future.
Thus, the aggregate supply curve is determined by the nominal anchor p?, from
which some firms will never deviate. Thus, if yt deviates from its equilibrium level,
firms that can adjust prices freely will opt for a different price than p?, inducing
welfare losses through inefficient labor allocation. So a price–level target of p?
emerges endogenously as welfare–optimal policy in the welfare function. Using a
second–order Taylor approximation of the utility function, the welfare–loss function
can be derived as
L1 = 1
2
E1
[
3∑
t=1
(
t−1∏
j=1
1
1 + ρj
){
(yt − y?)2 + θ
κt
(pt − p?)2
}]
. (2.3)
Monetary policy is characterized by the announcement of price path {pt}3t=1 to
forward guide expectations. The central bank’s objective is to minimize the
quadratic loss function subject to the aggregate demand curves, Equation (2.1) and
aggregate supply curves, Equation (2.2). According to Equation (2.3) the central
bank would like to close the price gap pt − p? in every period. This can always be
implemented if monetary policy is contemporaneously not constrained by the ZLB,
i.e. if the nominal rate iSt that induces pt − p? = 0, is positive. This incentive holds
irrespectively of any history {0, 1, . . . , t− 1} since Equations (2.1) and (2.2) only
include contemporaneous and forward–looking variables. This gives rise to a
dynamic inconsistency problem.
For the simulation exercises in Section 2.4 and 2.5 we choose a standard
calibration with A = 1, β = 0.99, σ = ϕ = 1 and θ = 5 (= 25 % markup). We
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choose α2 to be small to allow for high α1 when α1 → 1− α2: α2 = 0.1.4 For the
baseline calibration, we choose α1 = 0.25, such that in period 1 35 % of firms
cannot adjust their prices. We set λ = 1. The effects of different calibrations of α1
and λ will be discussed in the following sections. When introducing government
spending, we assume that in efficient equilibrium G?/Y ? = 0.2 and the inverse
intertemporal elasticity of substitution of government spending ηg = 1.
2.3 Discretionary policy
To provide the simplest framework for our liquidity trap analysis, we consider
the following thought experiment: before period 1 the economy is in its steady
state with price at target and output gap closed. The central bank is expected to
keep prices at target also in the future: E0[pt] = p?, t ∈ {1, 2, 3}. Following
Eggertsson (2006) we assume that in period 1 a negative time preference shock, ρ1,
with ρ1 < 0 < ρ¯ = ρ2, hits the economy and drives it to the zero lower bound. To
keep the exercise traceable, we assume that there is no persistence in the shock,
such that, without any policy responses, the economy will revert back to steady
state in period 2. Thus, in our setup the ZLB will be binding for one period only.
Solely by cutting the interest rate down to zero, the central bank cannot prevent a
recession in period 1, since this would require a negative nominal rate. It can,
however, announce to raise the price levels in the following periods above target p?
to lower the current real rate of interest and thus to stimulate current consumption
even when the nominal policy rate remains stuck at zero. To perfectly stabilize the
economy in the first period the central bank would need to credibly announce a
price level of p¯2 = p
? + |ρ1| for period 2. Such a policy, however, will never be
optimal commitment strategy: raising p2 above p
? causes inefficiencies and thus
welfare loss next period. The optimal commitment strategy is to promise to raise
p2 only so much that the marginal loss in period 2 (from accepting a price p2 > p
?)
will be just equal to the marginal gains in period 1 (from preventing p1 to fall too
far below p?).
Before we turn to the derivation of the optimal commitment strategy, we first
establish a result under discretion that is in stark contrast to a standard
inflation–targeting regime. Werning (2012) shows in his Proposition 2 for a
continuous time model with inflation targeting that welfare losses under discretion
are lowest when prices are fully rigid (see also Eggertsson and Krugman, 2012).
Although this results may seem counter–intuitive as price rigidity is a friction, it is
an intrinsic feature of inflation targeting. Assume that a contractionary shock
drives the economy on impact to the ZLB and it is known to remain there for one
4The calibration of α2 ∈ [0, 1− α1] has no qualitative effects on our results.
13
CHAPTER 2. FORWARD GUIDANCE AT THE ZERO LOWER BOUND IN A
MODEL OF PRICE-LEVEL TARGETING
period only. The shock depresses output and thus deflation emerges. Given that
inflation expectations are well anchored at inflation target pi? ≥ 0, the real rate is
given according to the Fisher equation by r = −Epi = −pi?. Therefore, the real rate
is affected neither by the strength of contemporaneous deflation nor the degree of
price stickiness. If price rigidity is increased, on–impact deflation is mitigated, as
prices can respond less to the shock, while output is further depressed through
price-induced, demand effects. Werning (2012) proves that the welfare–improving
effect dominates, such that discretionary welfare losses are lower, the more rigid
prices are.5
In contrast, price–level targeting features an automatic stabilization
mechanism through the real rate, as inflation expectations are not constant under
anchored price–level expectations. Under discretion the central bank implements
Pt = P
? once the ZLB stops binding. Therefore, the stronger the deflation
(undershooting) during the liquidity trap period, the higher is the rationally
anticipated inflation that leads the economy back to target. This reduces the real
interest rate and hence output shortfalls. Consequently, the lower price stickiness,
the stronger is deflation induced by the adverse ZLB-shock. While this creates
additional welfare losses through price deviations, output deviations are reduced.
For the limiting cases of perfect flexibility and perfect stickiness, the positive
output effect dominates the negative price effect, because – as under inflation
targeting– the weight on price deviations approaches zero for fully flexible prices
(see Equation (2.3)).6 Discretionary price and output gap are given by
(yD1 − y?) = σ1+κ1σρ1 and (pD1 − p?) = σκ11+κ1σρ1, respectively. Then, the discretionary
welfare loss is LD1 = 12 1+θκ1(1+σκ1)2 (σρ1)2. Let α = α1 + α2 be the fraction of sticky
prices in period 1. Since limα→0 κ1 →∞ and limα→1 κ1 → 0 it follows that
lim
α→0
LD1 = 0 < lim
α→1
LD1 =
1
2
(σρ1)
2 (2.4)
Consequently, the paradox of flexibility does not emerge under price–level targeting.
Even under discretion, undershooting the price–level target credibly triggers higher
inflation expectation, such that welfare losses due to deflation are attenuated by a
reduction in the real interest rate (see also Eggertsson and Woodford, 2003).
5We assume the ZLB to be binding for one period only. But the result remains unaffected if
it is binding for multiple periods. However, in that case the slope of the AD–curve is key: under
inflation targeting, the economy jumps to the upward sloping part of the AD–curve, whereas under
price–level targeting it remains at the downward sloping part. In the first case, inflation and output
gap are positively correlated, while in the second case the correlation is negative. Therefore, our
results can be extended to the multi-period case, since on a downward sloping AD–curve deflation
reduces output shortfall. We are grateful to an anonymous referee for pointing this out to us.
6Under inflation targeting and Calvo–pricing, the positive effect of price rigidity dominates its
negative effect through higher welfare weights. This is shown in Werning (2012), proposition 2.
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Interestingly, for certain parameter calibration, the effect of price rigidity on
aggregate welfare is non–monotonic. As shown in Figure 2.1, the maximum welfare
loss is reached at α¯ = 1+σϕ
2(1−σ
θ
)+σφ
. The location of that turning point is determined
by the intratemporal elasticity of substitution, θ relative to intertemporal elasticity
of substitution, σ. The higher the degree of inter-firm competition the more
left–skewed becomes the welfare–loss function. α¯ move towards zero in the unit
interval, i.e. a lower degree of price rigidity induces the maximum welfare loss,
while welfare loss at the limiting cases remains unaffected by α, as shown in
Equation (2.4). The intuition is the following: Equation (2.3) shows that higher
competition increases the welfare–weight of price deviations and therefore, ceteris
paribus, discretionary welfare loss. If firm competition is strong, i.e. intra-temporal
elasticity of substitution is high, the effect of price dispersion on demand for goods
is strong. The same price differential induces a stronger demand shift towards
cheaper goods. Consequently, for constant degree of price rigidity, production
choice and labor allocation become stronger distorted and aggregate welfare
decreases. For α¯ < 1⇔ 2σ < θ, i.e. inter–firm competition is strong enough,
aggregate welfare loss increases in α for α ≤ α¯ but decreases for α > α¯. The
intuition behind this non–monotonicity is as follows:
1. An increase in price rigidity, α, makes the AS–curve flatter increasing output
volatility for given price deviations pD1 −p?. This induces higher welfare losses.
2. In contrast, an increase in α reduces price volatility, which improves welfare.
3. However, an increase in α also raises the weight, θ/κ1, of price deviations in
the welfare loss function (see Equation (2.3)).7
For α ∈ [0, σ/(1 + σ)] the third effect dominates the second effect since the
increase of the welfare weight is initially stronger in α than the reduction in price
volatility. Therefore, for α low enough, the first and the aggregate effect of 2. and
3. work into the same direction and welfare losses rise in α. However, the second
effect is more convex than the third effect and thus the more α increases the
stronger becomes the former relative to the latter (at α = σ/(1 + σ) both effects
are equal). For α > σ/(1 + σ) the aggregate welfare effect of 2. and 3. turns
positive, attenuating the negative effect of higher output volatility. Since for
further increases in α the aggregate positive effect (2.+ 3.) on welfare is more
convex than the negative effect (1.) the former effect gradually catches up and at
α = α¯ the total effect of price rigidity on welfare starts turning positive.
Therefore, while the picture for the two extreme cases (α = 0 ∧ α = 1) is
clear–cut, the marginal effect of price rigidity on welfare depends on α¯. Only for
7Note that the weight on output deviations is normalized to unity.
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α¯ ≥ 1 a marginal decrease in price rigidity is always welfare–improving in our
model.
Figure 2.1: Price rigidities and welfare loss
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2.4 Optimal commitment policy
It is well understood that to obtain optimal stabilization, the announced price
path needs to be credible. Forward guidance suffers from a dynamic inconsistency
problem (Barro and Gordon, 1983): if the ex–ante announcement of the future
price–level path is successful in mitigating the ZLB, ex–post the central bank has
no incentive to stick to its promises but rather wants to return to the price level
target to minimize contemporaneous and future welfare losses.8 To analyze optimal
commitment policy, we assume that central bank announcements are perfectly
credible according to the following assumption:
Assumption 1. Feasible policy announcements xat+i, i ∈ N, about a variable
xt are credible in the sense that
Et[xt+i] = xat+i, i ∈ N
8For a discussion of dynamic inconsistency problem in forward guidance see for example Wood-
ford (2003).
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This assumption is no purely theoretical concept. Figure 2.2 provides
suggestive evidence for credible commitment of the US Fed, that engaged early into
explicit forward guidance. The solid line indicates the effective policy rate for the
US as estimated by Wu and Xia (2014), adjusting the actual rate for unconventional
policy measures. The vertical line indicates March 2009, the first time the Fed
announced ”exceptionally low levels of the federal funds rate for an extended
period.” While other unconventional measures have also contributed to driving the
effective policy rate further down, the Fed’s forward guiding announcements since
early 2009 have been a key factor (Campell, Evans, Fisher, Justiniano, Calomiris,
and Woodford, 2012). Therefore, provided a central bank has sufficient credibility,
forward guidance –combined with other unconventional policy measures– can
contribute successfully to mitigating the problem of the ZLB successfully.
Figure 2.2: Forward guidance in the US
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Notes: The time series for the effective policy rate is taken from Wu and Xia (2014). The vertical
line indicates March 2009, the first time when the Fed announced ”exceptionally low levels of the
federal funds rate for an extended period.”
To derive the optimal price path under forward guidance, from now on we
assume that forward guidance is fully credible according to Assumption 1. The
central bank is assumed to be able to guide the aggregate price level perfectly
through announcements.9 To solve for optimal policy in a liquidity trap we
minimize Equation (2.3) s.t. Equations (2.1) and (2.2), Assumption 1 and iS1 = 0.
9Dropping the expectation operator, the expected price level in periods 2 and 3 is given by
p2 = α1p
? + (1− α1)p?2 and p3 = α1λp? + (1− α1λ)p?3, respectively.
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The solution is given by
0 =
1 + θκ1
κ21
(p1 − p?) + 1
1 + ρ1
(1 + θκ2)(1 + κ1σ)
κ1κ2(1 + κ2σ)
(p2 − p?) + . . .
· · ·+ 1
1 + ρ1
1
1 + ρ¯
(1 + θκ3)(1 + κ1σ)
κ1κ3(1 + κ3σ)
(p3 − p?),
p1 − p? = κ1(1 + κ2σ)
κ2(1 + κ1σ)
(p2 − p?) + κ1σ
1 + κ1σ
ρ1,
iS2 = ρ¯+
1 + κ3σ
κ3σ
(p3 − p?)− 1 + κ2σ
κ2σ
(p2 − p?)
(2.5)
The first equation of (2.5) requires optimal policy to equalize marginal welfare
losses across time. Thereby, monetary policy is constrained by the remaining
equations. Since the ZLB is binding in period 1, i.e. iS1 = 0, there will be positive
co–movement between p1 and p2, as a higher p2 increases inflation between these
periods and thus lowers the real rate which stimulates demand in period 1. This is
shown in the second equation of (2.5). The short–term nominal rate between
periods 2 and 3, iS2 , is not necessarily zero as shown in the third equation of (2.5).
The optimal commitment under a price–level–targeting regime follows the
intuition for inflation targeting (see Krugman, 1998) closely. In period 1, a discount
factor shock disturbs the economy, driving the natural rate below zero. With the
ZLB restricting the short–term policy rate, a recession is triggered. While under
discretion the economy reverts back to steady state in period 2, optimal policy
dampens period 1 recession by promising overshooting (excess inflation) in period
2, forcing the real rate of interest in period 2 below its natural level rn2 = ρ¯. In
contrast to inflation targeting, where the economy never returns to the old price
path after the ZLB ceases binding, under price–level targeting and price stickiness
the central bank tries to return to p? in period 3. This requires deflation between
period 2 and 3. To be able to orchestrate a boom in period 2, the real rate must be
lowered below its natural level, despite these deflationary expectations. Since
agents have rational expectations, the real rate of interest is determined by the
Fisher equation. Thus, under credible price–level guidance the nominal rate has to
adjust consistently to the announced price path to satisfy the Fisher equation and
to implement the required real rate. This imposes a crucial constraint on credible
forward guidance with a price–level–targeting regime: the central bank cannot
promise to implement arbitrarily high deflation between periods 2 and 3 as this can
require a negative nominal interest rate. This can be seen when rearranging the
third equation of (2.5):
iS2 ≥ 0⇔ p3 − p2 ≥
κ3 − κ2
κ2[1 + κ3σ]
[p2 − p?]− κ3σ
1 + κ3σ
ρ¯ ≡ B ≤ 0 , (2.6)
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i.e. the maximum deviation of p3 from p2 is constraint below, depending on the
AS–curve slopes and the price path announced for period 2. This restriction does
not appear with inflation targeting, as excess inflation is not necessarily succeeded
by deflation. In this respect, while credible price–level targeting attenuates adverse
welfare effects under discretion, relative to inflation targeting, it can limit central
banks’ leeway to additional dampen deflation through forward guidance. For
arbitrary p2 − p? > 0 it holds that ∂B/∂α2 = 0 and ∂B/∂α1 > 0, i.e. the constraint
on optimal forward guidance is solely dependent on long–run price rigidity and
becomes more likely to bind, the more rigid prices are in the long run. To analyze
how this constraint affects forward guidance policy, let us first assume that the
shock in period 1, ρ1, is weak enough such that the ZLB will not be binding in
period 2.
Assumption 2a. The discount factor shock ρ1 is small enough such that
under optimal policy the ZLB is not binding on iS2 .
Under Assumption 2a and for p3 = p
? we can solve (2.5) for optimal policy
analytically.10 As long as the ZLB is not binding in period 2 the optimal price
target in period 3 is p3 = p
? for the following reason: as long as optimal policy is
able to dampen the recession via excess inflation in period 2 only, there is no need
to deviate in period 3 from the target p?. Any deviation in t = 3 would simply lead
to an offsetting adjustment in the unconstrained nominal rate iS2 according to the
third equation in (2.5). Price deviations in t = 3 can therefore not induce any real
effects and would only lead additional welfare losses due to price distortions.
Therefore, unconstrained optimal forward guidance implements p3 = p
?. Figure 2.3
shows the optimal policy paths compared to the discretionary solution given the
baseline parameter calibration and ρ1 = −0.01.
10Plugging the optimal commitment solution into Equation (2.6), Assumption 2a is identical to
|ρ1| ≤
(
1 + 11+ρ1
1+θκ2
1+θκ1
(
1+κ1σ
1+κ2σ
)2)
ρ¯.
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Figure 2.3: Optimal vs discretion policy
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Notes: Unconstrained commitment solution for baseline calibration and ρ1 = −0.01 to ensure that
the ZLB is not binding for iS2 .
Optimal policy orchestrates a boom in period 2, which, additionally to the
effects on inflation expectations, helps mitigating adverse ZLB effects through a
reduction in expected marginal utility of consumption in t = 2. This results is also
documented for a inflation–targeting regime by Werning (2012). With p3 = p
? but
p2 > p
? optimal unconstrained policy triggers deflationary expectations between
periods 2 and 3. If the discount factor shock is large enough, optimal policy might
be constraint be the ZLB even after the shock has fully abated, as shown in Figure
2.4 for ρ1 = −0.02 and different degrees of long–run price stickiness.
The lower the degree of price stickiness, the higher the overshooting the
central bank aims to implement in period 2. The transmission mechanism is
straightforward: the lower the degree of price stickiness, i.e. the smaller the fraction
of firms that fixed their prices at p?, the lower the weight of price deviations on
welfare losses for t = 2, 3.11 Therefore, price deviations from the target become less
costly and monetary policy less eager to hit the target. However, as discussed
above, not any overshooting can be credibly announced. As shown in the third
panel of Figure 2.4, if long–run price rigidity is relatively low, policy would like to
11Note that limα1→0
θ
κ2
= limα1→0
θ
κ3
= 0.
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orchestrate a strong overshooting in period 2 as missing the target is less expansive
in terms of welfare. But the thereby induced deflationary expectations from period
2 to 3 are strong enough to drive the nominal interest rate into negative territory.
Thus, the announcement of theses price paths cannot be credible, as agents
anticipate that the corresponding nominal rate violates the ZLB.
Figure 2.4: Effect of α1 on optimal policy
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Notes: All parameters except α1 are kept at their baseline calibration and ρ1 = −0.02 to ensure
that for α1 = 0.25 the ZLB is violated for i
S
2 .
Under optimal commitment, aggregate welfare losses decrease monotonically in
the degree of price stickiness. In particular, intertemporal losses approach zero if
long–run price rigidity, α1, goes to zero. Therefore, the result establish in Equation
(2.4) also holds with unconstrained forward guidance. With our pricing scheme,
welfare losses, due to price deviations, occur because some firms find it optimal not
to deviate from p?. If the fraction of these firms approaches zero, price deviations
from target in period 2 become cheaper and in the limiting case monetary policy
can stabilize period 1 perfectly by raising p2 to p
? + |ρ1|. However, with marginal
long–run price rigidity (α1 = ε), announcing this p2 is not credible, as the
corresponding deflation to p3 = p
? drives the nominal rate in period 2 below the
ZLB (third panel in Figure 2.4). Only with perfectly flexible prices in period 3,
α1 = 0, perfect stabilization is credible, as in that case p3 is indetermined. With
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prices being perfectly flexible, there is no longer a nominal anchor (dashed black
lines in panels 2 and 3, Figure 2.4). In that case, the ZLB in period 2 is no longer a
binding constraint, as p3 can always be chosen such that i
S
2 ≥ 0. Therefore, the
model features a discontinuity at α1 = 0. This discontinuity is independent of the
degree of short–run price stickiness (α2).
We now consider the case that the ZLB is a binding constraint also for period
2.
Assumption 2b. The discount factor shock ρ1 is large enough and/or the
degree of price stickiness is low such that under optimal policy the ZLB will be
binding also in period 2, violating Assumption 2a. In that case iS2 = 0
The severity of the shock drives nominal rates to zero and thus restricts
monetary authorities in implementing the optimal commitment price path. With
the feasible amount of deflation between periods 2 and 3 being limited, policy is
now restricted to be third best, requiring deviations from target also in period 3,
p3 > p
?, to be able to credibly promise sufficient excess inflation in period 2.
Using iS2 = 0 in (2.5) allows us to solve for constrained optimal policy
analytically. Figure 2.5 shows optimal policy with the ZLB being binding in period
2 compared to unconstrained optimal policy and the discretionary solution for
ρ1 = −0.05. Under constrained optimal policy, forward guidance can provide less
stimulation in period 1. The maximum downward jump in the price path from
t = 2 to t = 3 is constrained by the ZLB on iS2 as the central bank cannot provide
enough nominal ease to make any larger drop credible to agents. The drop in the
price level required is so large that it drives iS2 far into negative territory. As agents
anticipate that this is not feasible, the announced price path is thus not credible
and the monetary authority can only implement the constrained best solution
which induces higher aggregate welfare losses. Thus, third best policy has to keep
the short–run nominal rate at the ZLB even after the shock has gone. Crucially,
this is no direct consequence of the shock itself but of the optimal intertemporal
trade-off between raising p2 to attenuate the recession and the corresponding
deflation between period 2 and 3.12
12Whereas under unconstrained optimal policy the price path is decreasing between t = 2 and
t = 3, this is not necessarily the case for constrained forward guidance. If period 1 and period 2
prices are very rigid (α1 → 1−α2) but period 3 prices are very flexible, constrained optimal policy
can mostly affects period 1 price expectations via period 3 announcements. The optimal price path
is then increasing between periods 2 and 3.
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Figure 2.5: Optimal policy and the ZLB in period 2
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Notes: Constrained optimal solution for baseline calibration and ρ1 = −0.05 to ensure that the
ZLB is binding for iS2 .
The fact that under constrained optimal policy the economy does not return
to target is driven by our three–period assumption. Extending our model to n
periods, for n large enough the ZLB will at some point cease being a binding
constraint as the deflation required for returning to target can be spread across
sufficient periods. So, for large enough n, also constrained optimal policy will bring
the price level back to target. However, also in this case the ZLB will be a binding
constraint even after the shock has fully abated.
The effect of price stickiness on constrained optimal policy is similar to before.
Again, the lower the degree of price stickiness in the model, the more excess
inflation will be triggered under constrained forward guidance. For α1 = 0 the
economy can be stabilized perfectly, without any welfare losses occurring over time
as in that case the welfare weight on price deviations from period 2 on is zero. The
higher α1 the less accommodative policy is and for α1 = 1− α2 barely any excess
inflation will be announced. But due to a very flat AS–curve even these small
deviations will be very costly as they imply strong output deviations.
On a more theoretical note, Cochrane (2013) recently argued that most results
usually found in New Keynesian models during a liquidity trap are artifacts of an
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arbitrary equilibrium choice. To this end he introduces additional equilibria,
identified by different steady state inflation rates that persist once the ZLB stops
binding. These equilibria feature price paths that deviate arbitrarily from the old
equilibrium path. Within our setup, it is straightforward to show that this results
does not appear under price–level targeting. To this end, we introduce the degree
of period–3 price rigidity λ. For λ = 0 the price level in period 3 is perfectly
flexible. Potential deviations from target in period 3 can be stronger, the lower λ,
as the welfare weight of deviations approaches zero (limλ→0 θκ3 = 0). Consequently,
monetary policy can announce stronger overshooting for period 2, given that it is
optimal to let p3 overshoot more strongly. But even for λ close to zero no
arbitrarily large price deviations in period 3 do occur as any deviation from p? is
costly. Under price–level targeting, (constrained) optimal policy determines p3
uniquely. The price level p3 will be indetermined only for λ = 0. Hence, with only
marginal price rigidities (constrained) optimal policy eliminates price level
indeterminacy and thus does not support arbitrary equilibrium choice.
2.5 Optimal government spending
Up to now, policy could only stimulate during a zero interest rate environment
by forward guiding expectations about the future price path. We now introduce
government spending as an additional commitment device and analyze optimal
fiscal policy in interaction with monetary policy and price level targeting. To this
end, we follow Woodford (2011) and add additively separable government
consumption to the household’s utility function. Let Gt denote the amount of a
public good provided by the state and let G? denote the corresponding steady state
level. To keep this exercise as traceable as possible, we assume that government
spending is financed via a lump–sum transfers Tt and abstract from distortionary
taxes.13 Although stylized, this setup allows us to take a stance on the cyclicality
of optimal government spending in our discrete time model.
To see how government spending works in our model it is illustrative to
consider the modified (log-linear) aggregate demand curve, derived from the Euler
equation and market clearing condition Yt = Ct +Gt:
yt−y? = Et[yt+1−y?]+Et[gt−gt+1]− σ˜
[
iSt − ρt − Et[(pt+1 − p?)− (pt − p?)]
]
(2.7)
with gt ≡ Gt−G?Y ? and σ˜ ≡ σ(y? − g?), g? = log(G?). To stimulate period t
production fiscal policy has two instruments at hand: first, it can raise gt to induce
a direct demand effect on output and to make up for any private demand shortfall.
13For a setup with distortionary taxes see for example Eggertsson (2006).
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Second, it can announce a decreasing government spending path between period t
and t+ 1 (gt − Etgt+1 > 0). This increases marginal utility of consumption of
households in period t relative to period t+ 1, as agents anticipate that future
private consumption will be high due to less crowding–out. Hence, in addition to
the announcement of a price level path, the credible commitment to some optimal
path for government spending allows to attenuate the shock both directly and
indirectly.
Given the time preference shock, it might seem optimal to cut government
spending in the initial period in the same way as consumers cut current spending
–after all, the social planner should internalize the time preference shock. With
current real market rates being high, calling for austerity measures might be seen
as the optimal response. But realizing that shadow rates are low, optimal policy
will be characterized by intertemporal countercyclical spending shifts. It will be
optimal to shift the path of fiscal policy relative to the optimal first best path by
raising government spending (lowering taxes) in the first (the liquidity trap) period
relative to the second period (the period required to stimulate consumption by
keeping the real rate below the natural rate). It pays to aim at positive (negative)
additional spending during the period when the real rate is above (below) the
natural rate, as long as the social planner realizes that this helps to bring the
market rate closer to the shadow (natural) rate. Since even under commitment, it
is never optimal for monetary policy to bring the real rate down to the natural rate
during the liquidity trap period, additional instruments can always improve upon
pure monetary policy. In that sense, macro ”trumps” public finance.
Let us derive analytically the optimal government spending path under
Assumptions 1–2 and iS1 = 0 for the baseline calibration. Under full commitment
over both, the future price and government spending path, the joint monetary and
fiscal authority now minimizes
LG1 =
1
2
E1
 3∑
t=1
t−1∏
j=1
1
1 + ρj
{ϕ(yt − y?)2 + ηgg2t + ηu(yt − y? − gt)2 + θ(1 + ϕ)σκt (pt − p?)2
}
(2.8)
s.t.
p1 − p? = κ1(κ2 + σ˜)
κ2(κ1 + σ˜)
E1[p2 − p?] + κ1
κ1 + σ˜
(g1 − E1[g2])− i
S
1 − ρ1
κ1 + σ˜
(2.9)
p2 − p? = κ2(κ3 + σ˜)
κ3(κ2 + σ˜)
E2[p3 − p?] + κ2
κ2 + σ˜
(g2 − E2[g3])− κ2σ˜
κ2 + σ˜
[iS2 − ρ¯] (2.10)
with ηu ≡ 1σ Y
?−G?
Y ?
and denoting the ηg inverse intertemporal elasticity of
substitution of the public good. Equation (2.8) is derived from a second order
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approximation of the extended utility function. Equations (2.9) and (2.10)
represent the AS–AD equilibrium in periods 1 and 2, respectively, derived from
Equations (2.2) and (2.7). The solution to this optimization problem is shown in
Appendix A. Using these first–order–necessary conditions, one can derive the
following relationship: g1 = Σ1[p1 − p?], with Σ1 < 0 for any parameter calibration
(see Equation (A.11)). Therefore, independent of commitment and the ZLB,
optimal fiscal policy reacts countercyclical on impact. Thus, government
consumption, which, unlike private consumption, can be perfectly adjusted by
policy independently of the current market rate, is a tool to smooth output
fluctuations by leaning against the wind.
Unconstrained optimal policy features a countercyclical government spending
path with all variables returning to their equilibrium levels in t = 3 (see solid line
in Figure 2.6). The increase in government spending in period 1 makes up partially
for the shortfall in private consumption and the credible commitment to relatively
lower government spending in the future induces households to shift consumption
again into period 1 via lower marginal utility in future periods. However, as above,
implementing the unconstrained commitment path is feasible only as long as the
nominal interest rate is non–negative in period 2. If, however, the adverse shock is
large enough the ZLB will again be binding also in t = 2. The reason can be seen
in equation (2.10): given the optimal price level path, mitigating the ZLB might
require g2 − g3 to be positive, i.e. procyclical fiscal spending in period 2 or
deviations from g? in t = 3. This cannot be optimal and hence government
spending will not eliminate the possibility of a binding ZLB in period 2 in the
presence of large shocks. In this case monetary policy is again limited in its ability
to credible promise overshooting for t = 2 (third panel in Figure 2.6), such that, as
in Section 2.4, the drop from p2 to p3 is limited under constrained optimal policy
(dashed line in Figure 2.6).
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Figure 2.6: Optimal vs discretionary policy
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Notes: Parameters at baseline calibration. For this simulation ρ1 = −0.05.
However, government spending can partially make up for the short–fall of
monetary policy by providing additional stimulus in the first period compared to
the unconstrained solution. Note, however, that under constrained forward
guidance the indirect stimulative effect of government spending, via low marginal
utility of private consumption in the second period, is also constrained by the ZLB
in t = 2. Since, via Equation (2.10), ∂iS2 /∂(g2 − g3) > 0 an upward sloping
government spending path between period 2 and 3 exhibits additional downward
pressure on the nominal interest rate. Thus, the credible amount of future austerity
that can be promised in t = 1 is limited and g3 has to deviate below g
? to allow for
enough countercyclical spending in t = 2. In that sense, under constrained optimal
policy the short–run direct effect of countercyclical government spending is even
more important. If the central bank keeps the policy rate at the ZLB for an
extended period of time even after the shock abated, this should optimally be
accompanied with stronger front–loaded countercyclical fiscal policy. Any short–fall
in fiscal stimulus, e.g. due to procyclical austerity measures, will impose welfare
costs onto the economy as we show below.
Let us finally turn to discretionary policies. We consider two different
scenarios: first, we assume that monetary policy cannot commit to future activities
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and government spending is fully inactive (dotted line in Figure 2.6). Second, we
assume that both monetary and fiscal cannot commit but that fiscal policy reacts
optimally to the slump in period 1, for which no commitment is needed (ragged
line in Figure 2.6). Clearly, without any commitment possible and hands of
monetary policy being tied by the ZLB, fiscal policy can help to increase aggregate
demand to attenuate the recession. The demand effect of increasing government
spending and the deceasing government spending path offsets the slump partially
even without any credible promise to future excess inflation.
During the recent crisis there have been calls for austerity spending even when
policy rates are close to or at zero. To see the effects of such a policy we now
analyze the case that the fiscal government, just like the household, takes the real
rate as given and adjusts consumption accordingly, i.e. Gt = Ct ∀t ∈ {1, 2, 3}.
Thus, with a high real rate at the ZLB, government consumption will be shifted
into the future inducing a procyclical spending path and austerity. We assume that
households and monetary policy are aware of this behavior and that monetary
policy satisfies Assumption 1. In this case, forward guidance is again limited to the
announcement of the future price level path.
The dashed lines in Figure 2.7 show optimal forward guidance given passive
government behavior. For illustration, we consider the case of a small shock so that
the ZLB is not binding in the second period.14 Government spending is now
procyclical with high fiscal consumption when the real rate is low and vice versa.
This policy turns out to be worse in terms of welfare than optimal unconstrained
policy (solid line in Figure 2.7). The intuition is straightforward: procyclical
government spending with austerity in the recession period amplifies economic
fluctuations both through direct demand effects and via creating the incentive for
households to further postpone consumption until period 2 when marginal utility is
high.
Remarkably, procyclical fiscal policy also fares worse than the discretionary
solution with active government spending in period 1 (ragged line in Figure 2.7).
Since monetary policy internalizes the effects of its price level decisions onto
government behavior, it is more reluctant to trigger a boom in t = 2 as procyclical
fiscal policy would amplify the output effects of excess inflation. Despite lower
inflation in t = 2 the real rate in period 1 drops sharply as output and prices
deteriorate under procyclical fiscal spending. This partially dampens the drop in
consumption and government spending. The recession in t = 1 remains, however,
severe. This, together with further fluctuations in periods 2 and 3, induces higher
aggregate welfare losses than under discretionary monetary and fiscal policy. In the
14The results are similar for a binding ZLB in t = 2.
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latter case, losses in period 1 are high, but no additional losses occur in later
periods . It is important to note that this result holds qualitatively independently
of the calibration of ηu and ηg: it is independent of the weight of output and
government spending fluctuations in the welfare loss function.
Figure 2.7: Austerity policy
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Notes: Parameters at baseline calibration. For this simulation ρ1 = −0.01.
2.6 Conclusion
Most results –as well as paradoxes– established for optimal monetary and
fiscal policy at the ZLB, focus exclusively on the special case of Calvo pricing. This
assumption induces inflation targeting as welfare–optimizing monetary policy,
which makes forward guidance especially prone to the problem of dynamic
inconsistency. We considered optimal policy under an alternative pricing scheme,
where firms are ex–ante not perfectly identical, and showed that price–level
targeting emerges endogenously as welfare–optimizing policy.
We establish four main results: First and in contrast to inflation targeting,
under discretion a lower degree of price rigidity is welfare improving, as stronger
deflation increases inflationary expectations. The paradox of flexibility, as identified
by Werning (2012) and others, does not appear if the central bank targets the price
level directly instead of its growth rate.
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Second, under commitment price–level–targeting introduces a credibility
constraint on price–path announcements, that does not appear under inflation
targeting.
Through the Fisher equation, the nominal interest rate must be set
consistently with the announced price path. Optimal policy needs to induce
deflationary expectations between periods 2 and 3. Therefore, the monetary
authority faces a trade off between promising overshooting from period 1 to period
2 and the deflation required to bring the price level back to target in period 3.
Consequently, the amount of excess inflation in period 2 may be constrained by the
ZLB even after the shock has already faded away. This constraints the leeway of
central bank forward guidance. Under inflation targeting, periods of excess
inflation are not necessarily succeeded by periods of deflation. Therefore, the
amount of credible excess inflation for period 2 is not limited above.
Third, we have shown that price stickiness eliminates price–level indeterminacy
under optimal policy. Thus, the equilibrium choice, once the discount factor shock
abated and the ZLB ceases binding, is not arbitrary but well defined. With a
nominal anchor, optimal forward guidance policy aims to bring the price level back
to the target price level p? in period 3. Therefore, in our model the new equilibrium
choice is not arbitrary, as under inflation targeting (Cochrane, 2013), but optimal.
Finally, we extended the model to allow for fiscal policy as commitment
device. With the ZLB being binding, the market real rate of interest is above the
natural (shadow) rate in period 1. So it is optimal to shift the path of fiscal policy
relative to the optimal first best path by raising government spending (lowering
taxes) in the first relative to the second period. In contrast, procyclical austerity
policy induces even higher welfare losses than discretionary policy.
Appendix
A Optimal government spending: FOCs
Let µ and δ denote the Langrange parameters on constraint (2.9) and (2.10),
respectively. Given that policy announcements of paths {pt}3t=2 and {gt}3t=2 are
perfectly credible according to Assumption 1, we can drop expectation operators.
The first order necessary conditions for the optimization problem described by
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Equations (2.8)–(2.10) are given by
(p1) : Λ1[p1 − p?] + ηu
κ1
(
1
κ1
[p1 − p?]− g1
)
− µ = 0
(p2) :
1
1 + ρ1
{
Λ2[p2 − p?] + ηu
κ2
(
1
κ2
[p2 − p?]− g2
)}
+
κ1(κ2 + σ˜)
κ2(κ1 + σ˜)
µ− δ = 0
(p3) :
1
(1 + ρ1)(1 + ρ¯)
{
Λ3[p3 − p?] + ηu
κ3
(
1
κ3
[p3 − p?]− g3
)}
+
κ2(κ3 + σ˜)
κ3(κ2 + σ˜)
δ = 0
(g1) : ηgg1 − ηu
(
1
κ1
[p1 − p?]− g1
)
+
κ1
κ1 + σ˜
µ = 0
(g2) :
1
1 + ρ1
{
ηgg2 − ηu
(
1
κ2
[p2 − p?]− g2
)}
− κ1
κ1 + σ˜
µ+
κ2
κ2 + σ˜
δ = 0
(g3) :
1
(1 + ρ1)(1 + ρ¯)
{
ηgg3 − ηu
(
1
κ3
[p3 − p?]− g3
)}
− κ2
κ2 + σ˜
= 0
(µ) : p1 − p? = κ1(κ2 + σ˜)
κ2(κ1 + σ˜)
[p2 − p?] + κ1
κ1 + σ˜
(g1 − g2)− i
S
1 − ρ1
κ1 + σ˜
(δ) : p2 − p? = κ2(κ3 + σ˜)
κ3(κ2 + σ˜)
[p3 − p?] + κ2
κ2 + σ˜
(g2 − g3)− κ2σ˜
κ2 + σ˜
[iS2 − ρ¯] ,
with with Λ1 ≡ ϕκ21 + θ
α1+α2
1−α1−α2 , Λ2 ≡
ϕ
κ22
+ θ α1
1−α1 and Λ3 ≡
ϕ
κ23
+ θα1λ
α1λ
. We can use
the fourth and sixth equation to solve for g1 and g3 directly:
g1 =
ηu(κ1 + σ˜)− κ21Λ˜1
κ1(κ1 + σ˜)(ηg + ηu)− κ1ηu [p1 − p
?] ≡ Σ1[p1 − p?] (A.11)
g3 =
κ3Λ˜3 − ηu(κ3 + σ˜)
ηu − (κ3 + σ˜)(ηg + ηu) [p3 − p
?] (A.12)
For any parameter calibration it holds that Σ1 < 0, i.e. independent of
commitment and the ZLB, optimal fiscal policy always reacts countercyclical in
period 1. Eliminating Lagrange-Parameters and summarizing further yields:
0 =
Λ˜2
1 + ρ1
[p2 − p?]− ηu
κ2(1 + ρ1)
g2 +
κ1(κ2 + σ˜)
κ2(κ1 + σ˜)
Λ˜1[p1 − p?]− ηu(κ2 + σ˜)
κ2(κ1 + σ˜)
g1
+
ηu(κ2 + σ˜)
κ2(1 + ρ1)(1 + ρ¯)
[p3 − p?]− (κ2 + σ˜)(ηg + ηu)
κ2(1 + ρ1)(1 + ρ¯)
g3 = 0 (A.13)
0 =
ηu
κ2(1 + ρ1)
[p2 − p?]− ηg + ηu
1 + ρ1
g2 +
κ1Λ˜1
κ1 + σ˜
[p1 − p?]− ηu
κ1 + σ˜
g1
+
ηu
(1 + ρ1)(1ρ¯)
[p3 − p?]− ηg + ηu
(1 + ρ1)(1 + ρ¯)
g3 (A.14)
p1 − p? =κ1(κ2 + σ˜)
κ2(κ1 + σ˜)
[p2 − p?] + κ1
κ1 + σ˜
(g1 − g2)− i
S
1 − ρ1
κ1 + σ˜
(A.15)
p2 − p? =κ2(κ3 + σ˜)
κ3(κ2 + σ˜)
[p3 − p?] + κ2
κ2 + σ˜
(g2 − g3)− κ2σ˜
κ2 + σ˜
[iS2 − ρ¯] , (A.16)
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with Λ˜t ≡ Λt + ηuκ2t ,∀t ∈ {1, 2, 3}. Equations (A.11)–(A.16) is a system of 6
equations for 8 unknowns. Using, iS1 = 0 (ZLB in period 1) and p3 = p
? (ZLB not
binding in t = 2) or iS2 = 0 (ZLB binding in t = 2), it can be solved for optimal
policy.
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Bank Regulation through the Lens of
a Structural Banking Model
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CHAPTER3
Structural Stress Tests
Even though I walk through the valley of the shadow of
death,
I will fear no evil,
for you are with me;
your rod and your staff,
they comfort me.
– Psalm 23
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3.1 Introduction
State-of-the-art models for micro- and macroprudential stress tests derive bank
capital shortfalls during counterfactual scenarios relying on a combination of
exogenous, behavioral rules and reduced-form relationships that are extrapolated
from historical data. This approach is susceptible to breakdowns in these
relationships due to financial innovations, regulatory changes and large shocks and
it is prone to the Lucas critique. This chapter makes a first step towards a
microfounded stress testing framework.
To this end we propose a quantitative banking model for microprudential
stress testing, based on Corbae and D’Erasmo (2014). Our model can be
summarized according to four features. First, we consider a single bank’s
optimization problem in a partial equilibrium environment a` la De Nicolo, Gamba,
and Lucchetta (2014). To permit quantitative results, the model is closed by an
exogenous bank-specific loan demand equation that is derived from an estimated
model of discrete choice. Second, the bank rationally anticipates the likelihood of
stress, which influences optimal normal times behavior. Third, the bank can choose
to exit the market by liquidating assets at the cost of loosing its charter value.
Fourth, the bank conducts maturity transformation between demandable external
funding and term loans. We calibrate the model using balance sheet and income
statement data for a Norwegian banking group and track its behavior, including
the endogenous exit decision, during different stress scenarios.
Our main results are threefold: First, we show that the bank has an incentive
to hold a buffer stock of capital above the regulatory requirement to reduce the
likelihood of exit. However, excess capital is decreasing in the capital requirement,
such that, for a high enough requirement, excess capital holdings are zero and loan
supply becomes constrained by equity. For the 13 % baseline requirement the bank
does not hold any excess capital in the calibrated model. When we counterfactually
set the capital requirement to 0 % the bank holds an optimal 8.8 % capital ratio.
Second, we use the endogenous exit probability as a novel, forward looking
stress test metric when assessing the sufficiency of bank’s equity holdings under
stress. We show that measuring bank health against an exogenous equity threshold
(’hurdle rate’) can bias stress results if the bank prefers to exit the market with
equity above this threshold. Since exit leads to full loss of equity for the financial
institution, stress testing frameworks that do not allow for endogenous exit can
underestimate equity losses during stress. We find that with the current capital
requirement of 13 %, the calibrated bank has a 4 % probability of exit for a
probabilistic Markov stress scenario and it does not exit during various three-year
scenarios with different severity. Due to the identification of structural parameters
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in our framework, we can conduct stress tests with counterfactual capital
requirements. We show that for counterfactually lower capital requirements the
exit probability of the calibrated bank goes up to 27 % at the minimum Basel III
capital requirement of 4.5 % and the bank would exit the market during a
double-dip scenario.
Third, we contrast structural stress test results with those of a stylized
non-structural stress test. Following the CLASS approach (Hirtle, Kovner, Vickery,
and Bhanot, 2014), we show that stress tests that are based on the extrapolation of
historical correlations can substantially underestimate equity losses during stress.
Sluggish normal times dynamics of bank variables carry over to stress dynamics
and therefore attenuate potential non-linearities during the stress event. We find
that for the same stress scenario the structural stress test, which is based on
optimal behavior of the bank, projects equity to drop twice as much as projected
under the stylized reduced-form approach.
Related Literature. We contribute to two strands of literature: the
literature on structural banking models and on microprudential stress testing. Our
model is related to partial equilibrium models of banking such as Allen and Gale
(2004); Boyd and De Nicolo (2005); De Nicolo, Gamba, and Lucchetta (2014);
Bianchi and Bigio (2014). We extend these models with a calibrated bank-specific
loan demand equation to allow for quantitative results. In industrial organization
there is a long tradition of estimating firm-specific demand using discrete choice
models (see for example Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes, 1995). In banking, Dick
(2008) and Egan, Hortacsu, and Matvos (2015) apply this approach to the market
for deposits. Our approach is also related to the work of Elizalde and Repullo
(2007) by quantifying the wedge between regulatory and economic bank capital.
Our major contribution is to the microprudential stress testing literature. To
the best of our knowledge we are the first to employ a structural model for
quantitative stress testing. State-of-the-art stress testing frameworks use a
combination of reduced-form dependencies (Acharya, Engle, and Pierret, 2014;
Covas, Rump, and Zakrajcek, 2014) and exogenous behavioral rules (Burrows,
Learmonth, and McKeown, 2012; Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, 2013; Hirtle, Kovner, Vickery, and Bhanot, 2014; European Banking
Authority, 2011, 2014) to map aggregate economic conditions to bank-specific
variables.1 These frameworks do not identify structural parameters of the bank,
which makes them prone to the Lucas critique and limits their application to
counterfactual scenarios in macro variables. These frameworks can therefore not
1For a survey on state-of-the-art stress testing models see for example Foglia (2009); Borio,
Drehmann, and Tsatsaronis (2012).
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conduct stress tests under counterfactual capital requirements or risk weights, as
the estimated parameters are only implicit functions of these parameters. Our
model replaces backward looking and exogenous rules by optimizing forward
looking behavior based on first principals. Thereby the policy functions that
describe bank behavior become explicit function of exogenous states and structural
parameters. This offers a flexible laboratory for stress testing as a battery of
counterfactual scenarios can be considered without having to extrapolate from
observed conditions. In addition, we contribute by providing an optimal behavior
benchmark to analyze the quantitative implications of exogenous behavioral rules
as imposed in current stress testing frameworks.
3.2 Model
The setup is a partial equilibrium model of a single bank’s dynamic program.
We extend the framework of De Nicolo, Gamba, and Lucchetta (2014) along three
dimensions: first, rather than taking bank cash flow to be reduced form, we model
cash flow as an explicit function of bank-specific loan demand and non-performing
loans (see Corbae and D’Erasmo, 2014). Second, we derive bank-specific loan
demand from an estimated discrete choice model. As a result, bank’s loan demand
depends on competitors’ interest rate setting through market share considerations.
Third, we introduce heterogeneous loan demand from different sectors of the
economy, for example retail and commercial loan demand, to increase balance sheet
granularity and to study portfolio reallocation motives during stress.
Time is discrete, indexed by t and infinite. Each period is dividend into two
subperiods: beginning of period (bop) and end of period (eop). The bank supplies
risky term loans to sector s ∈ S. Funding supply dt is stochastic and follows a
Markov process with transition matrix ∆(dt+1, dt). The bank is exposed to an
aggregate Markov shock zt with transition matrix F(zt+1, zt), which affects loan
demand and non–performing loans.
3.2.1 Demand for loans
To derive bank i- and sector s-specific loan demand we employ a discrete
choice model a` la Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995). This way, we derive
idiosyncratic loan demand, List, as a function of bank i’s own interest rate and the
interest rates charged by all other banks in sector s. In the absence of an industry
equilibrium, we impose exogenous behavior on all other banks’ interest rate choice,
and study i’s optimal rate setting choices conditional on these assumptions.
Let Is denote the universe of all credit suppliers to sector s. Subscript i
denotes bank i variables and subscript −i denotes corresponding variable vectors of
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all other credit suppliers, such that i+ (−i) = Is.
There is a mass ωt of potential borrowers drawn from distribution B(ω|θ, zt),
with support [ω, ω¯], θ being a parameter vector and zt being beginning-of-period
aggregate state. Entrepreneurs face a two stage problem: first they decide whether
to invest into a risky project or not. If they decide to invest, they choose next to
which bank i ∈ Is to go to. Following Egan, Hortacsu, and Matvos (2015), a loan
with interest rate rList received from bank i in sector s, generates utility αsr
L
ist for a
potential borrower ωj. In addition, ωj also receives non-interest utility δis + εjist
when borrowing from group i, where δis captures time-invariant but group-specific
factors and the i.i.d shock εjist captures any borrower-specific bank preferences. We
assume that ε follows an extreme value distribution, G(ε) = exp(− exp(−ε)).
Therefore, potential borrower ωj’s total utility conditional on receiving a loan from
bank i in sector s and period t is given by
u(εjist) = αsr
L
ist + δis + εjist
Let Ust denote the expected utility of ωj when taking a loan and choosing bank i
optimally
Ust =
∫ +∞
−∞
max
i
{u(εjist)} dG(ε)
It can be shown that by properties of the extreme value distribution, this can be
rearranged to
Ust = γ + log
(
Is∑
i=0
exp
(
αsr
L
ist + δis
))
,
where γ is the Euler constant. When not investing into a risky project, potential
borrower ωj’s utility is given by the stochastic realization of the outside option ωjt.
Therefore, ωj’s first-stage problem is given by
max
x∈{0,1}
{
wx=0t (ωjt), w
x=1(rList, r
L
−ist)
}
with
wx=0t (ωjt) = ωjt
wx=1t (r
L
ist, r
L
−ist) = Ust ,
where x is the choice of taking a loan (x = 1) or not taking a loan (x = 0).
Integrating over the mass of potential borrowers, we obtain a measure of borrowers
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in sector s and period t
M(zt, r
L
ist, r
L
−ist) =
∫ ω¯
ω
I
[
wx=1t (r
L
ist, r
L
−ist) > w
x=0(ωj)
]
dB(ω|θ, zt) (3.1)
As a result, bank-i-specific loan demand is given by
L(rList, r
L
−ist, zt) = σ(r
L
ist, r
L
−ist)×M(rList, rL−ist, zt) , (3.2)
where σ(rList, r
L
−ist) is bank i’s share in M . With the assumption of the extreme
value distribution for εjist, σ(r
L
ist, r
L
−ist) is given by
σ(rList, r
L
−ist) =
exp(αsr
L
ist + δis)∑Is
k=0 exp(αsr
L
kst + δks)
(3.3)
In addition, this framework induces a mapping between the aggregate sectoral loan
rate rLst and idiosyncratic loan rates {rList}Is :
rLst =
Is∑
k=1
σkst × rLkst. (3.4)
3.2.2 Bank environment
Beginning of period At the beginning of period t there are two
endogenous state variables: stock of securities at, and heritage loans {`st}S . In
addition there are two exogenous states: aggregate state zt and external funding
stock dt. Bop equity is given by
et = at +
∑
S
`st − dt.
Given these states, the bank makes beginning-of-period portfolio choices. The
liability side is pre-determined through state dt. On the asset side, the bank
chooses sector-specific loan supply Lst and security holdings At. We follow De
Nicolo, Gamba, and Lucchetta (2014) and assume that loans have an exogenous
maturity 1/(1 +ms) such that each period a constant fraction ms of loans Lst
matures. While sector-specific maturity is exogenous, the fact that the bank
endogenously chooses its loan exposure to the different sectors induces an
endogenous aggregate loan portfolio maturity. The bank can decide to reduce loan
exposure faster than at rate ms. In this case it must pay quadratic adjustment
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costs on disinvestment Lts − `ts < 0
Ψs(Lst) = I(Lst < `st)ψs[Ls − `st]2 , ∀s ∈ S , (3.5)
where I(·) denotes the indicator function and ψs is the cost coefficient. Marginal
adjustment costs are increasing in |Lst − `st| to reflect increasing reductions on loan
face value if a large fraction of the loan stock has to be liquidated and sold off.
These costs can capture both liquidation costs that arise when loans are sold off
and fire sale costs due to sudden and large reductions in the loans stock. In
contrast, increasing the loan exposure by choosing Lst ≥ `st does not generate
adjustment costs. This induces the flow-of-funds constraint
at − At =
∑
S
[(Lst − `st) + Ψ(Lst)] , (3.6)
which states that, given external funding supply dt, the change in security
investment and the change in loan investment (including adjustment costs) must be
equal. Bank’s portfolio choice is subject to a regulatory minimum capital constraint
ϕ
(∑
S
wsLts + wAAt
)
≤ et (3.7)
where ϕ is the minimum regulatory common equity Tier 1 capital ratio
requirement and wk, k ∈ {s, A}, are regulatory risk-weights. We model the
regulatory capital requirement as a hard constraint, i.e. it is never be violated on
the equilibrium path.2
Securities pay a safe interest of ra and performing bank loans generate an
interest payment of rLst. However, a fraction (1− pst+1) of loans is non-performing.
These loans pay no interest and a fraction λs has to be written down, reducing next
period loan stock `st+1. We assume that pst+1 = p(r
L
st, zt, zt+1).
End of period Eop is initiated with the realization of the new aggregate
shock zt+1 and the new funding supply shock dt+1.
3 The aggregate shock
determines the fraction of non–performing loans (1− p(rLts, zt, zt+1)) in the bank’s
2One can think of this as the bank having to pay a prohibitively high regulatory fine if it violates
this constraint, such that it would prefer to exit the market in the previous period than entering
a period were the constraint cannot be satisfied. Modeling the minimum capital requirement has
a hard constraint is in line with the BIS view, which motivates the counter-cyclical capital buffer
as a way of giving banks a capital cushion, which can be eaten into before hitting the minimum
requirement (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2010).
3We use the timing convention that all variables that are determined after the realization of the
aggregate shock zt+1 have time index t+ 1.
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loan portfolio. At this stage, bank’s cash flow is given by
ct+1 =
∑
S
[
pst+1(ms + r
L
st)Lst − Ξ(Lst)
]
+ raAt − rddt + (dt+1 − dt)− κ , (3.8)
where Ξ(Lst) captures non-interest expenses of loan providence such as screening
and monitoring costs and κ are fixed costs of operations in the loan market. We
assume that loan interest rates are floating. This is reflected in the fact that
contemporaneous interest rate rLts applies to all loans Lst, including the loan stock
`st. This assumption reduces the state space, as we do not need to keep track of the
whole history of loan supply. Non–performing loans do not pay any interest.
Exogenous funding supply induces fluctuations in cash flow. If dt+1 > dt the bank
receives an eop cash inflow and vice versa.
The bank now decides on its dividend policy, Dt+1. If cash flow, ct+1, is
positive, it can be distributed as dividends or retained to raise next period initial
security stock. If cash flow is negative, the bank has access to a short-term
liquidity market, where it can borrow at cost rb against securities as collateral, or it
can offer seasoned equity. Let Bt+1 < 0 denote retained earnings and Bt+1 > 0
denote short-run borrowing. Short-term borrowing requires collateral in form of
securities, in the sense that gross repayment of short–term borrowing must not
exceed contemporaneous security holdings:
(1 + rb)Bt+1 ≤ At , (3.9)
with rb = 0 if Bt+1 ≤ 0. Short-term borrowing is repaid in securities and therefore
reduces next period security stock. We assume that risky loans can not be used as
collateral for short-term borrowing. Seasoned equity offerings are subject to an
issuance cost ν(xt, zt+1), with ∂ν/∂x > 0 and ∂ν/∂z < 0. Dividends are determined
as
Dt+1 =
ct+1 +Bt+1 , if ct+1 +Bt+1 ≥ 0ct+1 +Bt+1 − ν(ct+1 +Bt+1, zt+1) , if ct+1 +Bt+1 < 0 . (3.10)
Each period a fraction ms of loans exogenously matures at the beginning of
each period. Non-performing loans are written down immediately with λs.
Therefore, beginning of period t+ 1 heritage loans are given by
`t+1s = [1−ms]pst+1Lst + (1− pst+1)[1− λs]Lst ,∀s ∈ S. (3.11)
Also, at the beginning of period t+ 1, before any choice is made, the short-term
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liquidity market clears, i.e. Bt+1 is repaid. Thus, beginning of next periods
securities at+1 are given by
at+1 = At − (1 + rb)Bt+1 ≥ 0. (3.12)
As discussed above, retained earnings (Bt+1 < 0) raises at+1 and thus resources the
beginning of the next period, which can be invested into either loans or securities.
Figure 3.1 summarizes our timing assumption.
Figure 3.1: Timing assumption
{at, {`st}S , zt, dt}
At, {Lst}S
zt+1
dt+1 ct+1
stay exit
Bt+1,Dt+1, at+1, {`st+1}S
{at+1, {`st+1}s, zt+1, dt+1}
At+1, {Lst+1}s
zt+2
dt+2 ct+2
3.2.3 Bank’s dynamic programming problem
Due to the recursive nature of the bank’s problem, we can drop time
subscripts. Let xt = x and xt+1 = x
′. The bank’s objective is to maximize expected
franchise value,
Et
+∞∑
k=t+1
βkDk , (3.13)
where β is equity holders’ discount factor. The value of the bank at the beginning
of the period is given by
V (a, {`s}S , z, d) = max
A,{Ls}S
β Ez′|z,d′|dW (A, {Ls}S , z′, d′)
s.t.
e = a+
∑
S
`s − d ,
a− A =
∑
s
[(Ls − `s) + Ψ(Ls)] , (3.14)
ϕ
(∑
s
wsLs + wAA
)
≤ e ,
Ls = L
d
s , ∀s ∈ S
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The last constraint requires bank–specific loan market clearing, where Lds is
bank-specific loan demand from sector s, given by Equation (3.2). The eop value is
given by
W (A, {Ls}S , z′, d′) = max
x∈{0,1}
{
W x=0(A, {Ls}S , z′, d′) ,W x=1(A, {Ls}S , z′, d)
}
,
where x = 1 denotes exit, and x = 0 denotes continuation. The exit value is given
by
W x=1(A, {Ls}S , z′, d) = max
{
0 ,
∑
S
[
(ms + r
L
s )p
′
sLs −Ξ(Ls) +`′s −Ψ(`′s)
]
+(1 + ra)A
− (1 + rd)d− κ
}
(3.15)
Upon exit the bank receives eop cash flow plus the principal on liquid securities. It
liquidates the entire loan portfolio subject to adjustment costs, repays principal to
external creditors and does not accept new external debt. If cash flow is sufficiently
low, such that after liquidation of assets external creditors cannot be fully repaid,
limited liability kicks in. The continuation value is given by
W x=0(A, {Ls}S , z′, d′) = max
B′≤ A
1+rb
{D′ + V (a′, {`′s}S , z′, d′)}
s.t.
c′ =
∑
s
[{
p′s
(
ms + r
L
s
)}
Ls − Ξ(Ls)
]
+ raA− rdd+ (d′ − d)− κ
Dt+1 =
ct+1 +Bt+1 , ct+1 +Bt+1 ≥ 0ct+1 +Bt+1 − ν(ct+1 +Bt+1, zt+1) , ct+1 +Bt+1 < 0 (3.16)
a′ = A− (1 + rb)B′ ≥ 0
`′s = [1−ms]p′sLs + (1− p′s)[1− λs]Ls, ∀s ∈ S
3.2.4 Equilibrium Definition
Given parameters {ϕ, {ws}S , wA, ra, rb, rd}, costs functions {Ξ,Ψ} and
stochastic processes {zt, dt} a pure strategy Markov-perfect equilibrium is defined
as a sequence of bank’s policy rules {Vt, At, {Lst}, xt+1, Bt+1,Dt+1} such that given
loan demand Ld(rLt , zt) bank’s choices of {At, {Lst}, xt+1, Bt+1,Dt+1} are consistent
with the two-stage optimization problem in Section 3.2.3.
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3.3 Calibration
One period corresponds to a quarter. The bank in the model corresponds to a
banking group. A banking group is the consolidated retail banking unit and any
associated credit companies, which emerged in Norway in 2007 and have since
become an important funding source for banking groups (see Raknerud and Vatne,
2013). We allow for two sectors s ∈ S ={retail, C&I}. The data is taken from the
Norges Bank ORBOF database, which provides information about individual
Norwegian banks’ balance sheets, income statements and interest rates. All
parameters are in real terms. We deflate using total CPI index. We calibrate the
model to one big Norwegian banking group.
3.3.1 Loan demand calibration
To calibrate banking group i- and sector s-specific loan demand curve
List = L(r
L
ist, r
L
−ist, zt), defined in Equation (3.2), we proceed as follows: first,
we estimate market shares for the Norwegian banking groups as predicted by the
mode of discrete choice (Equation (3.3)). Second, we approximate aggregate
sectoral loan demand (Equation (3.1)) and estimate the approximated function on
Norwegian data as well.
Market share estimation. We estimate Equation (3.3) using interest rate
and loan volume data for the five biggest Norwegian banking groups. We define
each group’s market share by sector, σ˜ist, as gross lending to sector s relative to
total credit to sector s.4 Following Egan, Hortacsu, and Matvos (2015), we allow
the quality of the bank to vary over time. Let ζist denote the time-varying quality
component. Then total bank quality is given by δis + ζist. Since we do not observe
interest rates and loan volumes for all other loan suppliers except the banking
groups (e.g. financial companies, shadow banks), we treat those sources for credit
as an unobservable outside good, which we index by 0. We normalize non-interest
utility of the outside good to zero, δ0s + ζ0st = 0. Dividing sist in Equation (3.3) by
s0st, taking logs and plugging in empirical counterparts, we get
log σ˜ist = αsr˜
L
ist + δ˜is +$st + ζ˜ist , ∀s ∈ S , (3.17)
where r˜List denotes the credit rate, δ˜is is a firm- and sector-fixed effect,
$st ≡ log s˜0st − αr˜L0st is a sector- and time-fixed effect. This equation is identical to
the equation estimated in Egan, Hortacsu, and Matvos (2015). To identify the
demand curve, we use the Libor interest rate as a supply shifter. Table 3.1(a)
4Data source for total credit by sector is SSB, Table 06718: Gross domestic debt, by credit
source and borrower.
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shows the estimation results. The estimates parameters are used to calibrate
Equations (3.1) and (3.3).
Table 3.1: Estimation results: share and aggregate loan regression
(a) Loan Share Regression
log σ˜ist Parameter (I) Retail (II) C&I
r˜List αs −0.0514??? −0.0276?
r˜List elasticity −0.1845 −0.1072
obs 255 255
R2 (within) 0.52 0.21
(b) Aggregate Credit Regression
log M˜t Parameter (I) Retail (II) C&I
r˜Lt β1s −3.648??? −3.600??
log z˜t β2s 2.050
??? 1.85???
r˜Lt elasticity −13.788 −13.754
dummy 2008 X –
obs 51 51
Notes: Panel (a): Dependent variable is log market
share in total credit to sector s. The panel is balanced
with quarterly observations from 2001Q1 to 2014Q2
for five Norwegian banking groups. Bank- and sector-
specific interest rate instrumented with Libor. All
variables are deflated with Norwegian CPI.
Panel (b): Dependent variable is log total credit to
sector s. Data from 2001Q1 to 2014Q2. Aggregate
loan rate instrumented with Libor. Due to a struc-
tural break in the time series for retail credit after
2008, we include an additional dummy variable. All
variables are deflated with Norwegian CPI.
? ? ?p < 0.01, ? ? p < 0.05, ?p < 0.10.
Aggregate level estimation. Unlike Egan, Hortacsu, and Matvos (2015),
we do not take the mass of borrowers to be constant, but let sectoral loan demand
respond to changes in the aggregate loan interest rate and the aggregate state. We
approximate Equation (3.1) by
M(zt, r
L
ist, r
L
−ist) = M(zt, r
L
st) = exp
(
cs + β1r
L
st + β2 log zt
)
,
i.e. we approximate the set of idiosyncratic loan rates by all credit suppliers in
sector s by the average loan rate, rLst, and impose a functional form assumption on
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Mst.
5 We calibrate Mst by estimating this equation on Norwegian credit data:
log M˜st = cs + β1sr˜
L
st + β2s log z˜t + st , ∀s ∈ S , (3.18)
where log M˜st denotes log HP-filtered (λ = 400, 000)
6 total credit to sector s7, r˜Lst is
average interest rate for total lending to sector and log z˜t denotes log, HP-filtered
(λ = 3000) real GDP.8 Due to a lack of data, we do not observe r˜Lst directly.
Therefore, we approximate it using the average loan rate charged by all Norwegian
banking groups, which is a good proxy, given that banking groups have an average
market share of 73 % and 76 % in total C&I and retail credit, respectively. To
identify credit demand, we use the Libor rate as supply shifter. Since we work with
a normalization in our model (zG = 1), the estimated constant c is not relevant.
Instead, we recalibrate c to match average credit over GDP in sector s conditional
on average loan rate and zt = zG. Table 3.1(b) shows estimation results.
Mapping to the model. Given that we consider a single bank’s decision
problem, we assume that the interest rates of all other credit suppliers, except for
the bank under consideration, remain constant: rL−ist = r¯
L
s , such that Equation
(3.4) simplifies to
rLst = σist × rList + (1− σist)× r¯Ls , (3.19)
where σist is given by Equation (3.3). In the model, we approximate the continues
GDP-measure, z˜t with the discretized aggregate process zt. In the data ’normal
times’ GDP corresponds to GDP on trend, i.e. z˜t = 0. In the model, ’normal times’
corresponds to zt = zG = 1. We must therefore adjust the constant to reflect this
normalization. Given the estimated dependencies (3.17) and (3.18) and Equation
(3.19), loan demand (3.2) is given by
L(rList, r¯
L
s , zt) = σ(r
L
ist, r¯
L
s )×M(zt, rLst)
= σ(rList, r¯
L
s )× exp(cs + β1srLst + β2szt)
= σ(rList, r¯
L
s )× exp(cs + β1s[σ(rList, r¯Ls )rList + {1− σ(rList, r¯Ls )}r¯Ls ] + β2szt),
∀s ∈ S
We set r¯Ls equal to the average quarterly sectoral lending rate for total credit,
approximated by Norwegian bank lending rate.
5We choose to approximate Equation (3.1) since an analytical solution is not feasible.
6The choice of parameter is owned to the fact that credit cycles are about four times longer than
business cycles and follows Borio and Lowe (2002).
7SSB, Table 06718: Gross domestic debt, by credit source and borrower.
8Data source for GDP is SSB, Table 09190: Gross domestic product Mainland Norway, market
values, sa, 2011 prices.
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3.3.2 Non-performing loans estimation
The non-performing loans share, [1− p(rList, zt, zt+1)], is a function of loan rate,
rList, at the beginning of the period aggregate state, zt, and end of period aggregate
state, zt+1. For normal business cycle times, we derive this dependency from
Norwegian banking data, while for crisis times, we assign fraction of
non-performing loans to the exogenous stress scenario.
We estimate the following panel equation for the 5 largest Norwegian banking
groups for normal business cycle times
(1− p˜ist) = c+ γ1sr˜List + γ2s log z˜t + γ3s log z˜t−1 + δis +$s + ist , ∀s ∈ S , (3.20)
where (1− p˜ist) denotes non-performing loans as a fraction of gross lending of
group i in sector s and quarter t, r˜List is the corresponding lending rate and log z˜t is
HP-filtered (λ = 3000) log real GDP. To account for seasonal patterns in the
non-performing loans data, the regression also includes quarter dummies, $. We
account for time-invariant heterogeneity between banking groups by adding firm
fixed effects, δis. Table 3.2 shows the estimation results.
Table 3.2: Estimation results: non–performing loans
(1− p˜ist) (I) Retail (II) C&I
cs 0.4585
??? 0.7739???
r˜List 0.0752
??? 0.1835???
log z˜t −0.0479??? −0.1872???
log z˜t−1 −0.0308?? −0.0828?
δis X X
$ X X
obs 241 241
R2 (within) 0.38 0.21
Notes: Dependent variable is non-
performing loans in sector s. Data from
2001Q1 to 2014Q2 from ORBOF data
base. Regression includes quarter dum-
mies and firm fixed effects. All variables
are deflated with Norwegian CPI.
? ? ?p < 0.01, ? ? p < 0.05, ?p < 0.10.
3.3.3 Aggregate shock calibration
We assume that the aggregate shock, zt, follows a four state Markov process
z ∈ Z = [zH zL zC zR]. We need to calibrate the state vector Z and the transition
matrix F(z′, z) ∈ R4×4. In our model, z is the only source of aggregate fluctuations.
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Therefore, it captures normal business cycle fluctuations, as well as the aggregate
component of the stress scenario. We allow for two states to capture normal
fluctuations: a high state, zH , and a low state, zL. These states and their transition
probabilities are calibrated to capture the normal Norwegian business cycle. There
is one crisis state, zC , and one recovery state, zR, which captures a smooth
transition out of crises. This section lays out the calibration of parameters that are
not part of the stress scenario. We calibrate the Markov process using the Barro
and Ursua (2008) data set, which captures boom-bust cycles for 36 countries
between 1870 and 2008. We extend the data until 2013 and identify GDP peaks
and troughs using the method suggested in Barro (2006).9 The average contraction
from a business cycle peak to a non-crises trough is −2.58 % in Norway. We
normalize zH to unity and set zL = zH − 0.0258 = 0.9742 to match the average
business cycle contraction.
Consider transition probabilities next. Let qij denote the probability of
switching from state i to j. For the transition matrix F(z′, z) we impose the
following zero restrictions:
F(z′, z) =

qHH qHL 0 0
qLH qLL qLC 0
0 0 qCC qCR
0 qRL 0 qRR
 ,
i.e. from zH only zL can be reached, the only way into a crisis is through zL, the
recovery state zR can only be reached from the crisis state and from the recovery
state only zL can be reached. To derive the switching probabilities between normal
times state we follow Barro and Ursua (2008) and estimate these probabilities as
the ratio of normal times Norwegian boom–bust cycles (13) over normal time years
(118). Then, qHL = qLH = 13/118 = 0.1102 and qHH = 1− 0.1102 = 0.8898. We
transform these annual probabilities to quarterly probabilities, qQij , through
qij =
(
qQij
)4
.
Calibrating the crisis states. Our framework offers a flexible laboratory
to analyze counterfactual stress dynamics, since potentially all parameters can
depend on the aggregate state zt. The scenario we provide here is to illustrate the
mechanics of our model. We consider a stress scenario in which a strong reduction
in GDP depresses loan demand and induces a jump in non–performing loans. One
can think of this scenario as a credit crisis.
The stress scenario requires calibration of aggregate states {zC , zR}, the
9Extended data is taken from WDI database.
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corresponding transition probabilities {qLC , qCC , qCR, qRR, qRL} and fraction on
performing loans during crisis states
{p(zL, zC), p(zC , zC), p(zC , zR), p(zR, zR), p(zR, zL)}.
In the aggregate shock process, zt, there is one crisis state, zC , and one
recovery state, zR. Since crises observations in Norway are limited, we derive the
crisis calibration from the average of 177 international crises observations in the
Barro and Ursua (2008) data set. They define a crisis as a GDP contraction larger
9.5 %. In the data, the average GDP contraction from peak to crisis trough is
−20.56 %. Since the normal business cycle peak is identified by zH we set
zC = zH − 0.2056 = 0.7944. To calibrate the recovery state zR, we measure the
average recovery time from crisis trough back to GDP trend. We find that it takes
on average 2.95 years to recover back to trend. We identify zR as the average GDP
contraction after half the recovery time: zR = 0.9455.
The probability of leaving normal times and entering a crisis is the ratio of
crises observations over normal time years of all 36 countries. In our data set we
have 5440 yearly observations including 515 crises years, during 177 crises, and
4925 normal time years. Then qLC = 177/4925 = 0.0359 and
qLL = 1− qLH − qLC = 0.8539. Along the same line, the probability of leaving a
crisis and starting a recovery is estimated as the ratio of crises observations over
crises year, i.e. qCR = 177/515 = 0.3437. Thus, qCC = 1− qCR = 0.6563. This
implies an expected crisis duration from peak to trough of 2.9 years. Finally, we
calibrate the recovery persistence to match the average recovery duration (trough
to trend) of 2.95 years in the data. Since the expected recovery duration is given by
1/(1− qRR), we have qRR = 0.6600 and qRL = 0.3400.
Consider non-performing loans next. We assume that on crisis impact the
fraction of non–performing loans jumps to 14 % of total loans independent of
interest rate, 1− p(rLst, zL, zC) = 0.14 ,∀s. This value is taken from the Laeven and
Valencia (2012) banking crisis data set and corresponds to mean peak
non-performing loans. When staying in a crisis for multiple periods,
non-performing loans are assumed to be 50 % below impact non-performing loans:
1− p(rLst, zC , zC) = 0.14× 0.5. When leaving the crisis trough and entering a
recovery non-performing loans are 1− p(rLst, zC , zR) = 1− 0.04. For the remaining
state combinations involving zR we let non-performing loans follow the process
estimated in Section 3.3.2.
3.3.4 External funding shock calibration
The external idiosyncratic funding shock process dit is calibrated by estimating
the following dynamic model on the banking-group level for the period
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1987Q4-2014Q2 for the 5 largest Norwegian banking groups:
log d˜it = (1− ρ)k0 + ρ log d˜it−1 + k1t+ k2t2 + uit ,
where d˜t is the sum of outstanding deposits, bonds and commercial papers, t is a
linear time trend and ut ∼ N(0, σ2). Using the estimates for ρˆ = 0.8695 and
σˆ = 0.0365, we discretize the process with the method of Tauchen and Hussey
(1991) into a three states Markov representation dt = [dL dN dH ] and to obtain the
transition matrix ∆(dt+1, dt). Since the aggregate state is normalized (zH = 1), the
estimated mean k0 is not relevant in our model. Instead we calibrate the mean of
the finite state Markov process such that, given our sectoral demand equation, the
ratio [Lretail(r¯
L
retail, zH) + LC&I(r¯
L
C&I , zH)]/dN corresponds to the average total
lending of external finance ratio for this banking group.
3.3.5 Remaining parameter calibration
Consider parametric interest rates first. All rates are calibrated using
1987Q1-2014Q2 variable averages. The marginal external funding cost parameter,
rd, is calibrated as the ratio of interest charges on deposits and bonds over the total
stock of deposits and bonds. In this preliminary calibration we set
ra = rb = 1.001× rd.
Due to a lack of data, we cannot calibrate loss-given default, λ, by sector but
instead assume that it is identical between retail and commercial sector. We
calibrate λ to target total loss on lending of a banking group in the data. In the
model total loss on lending is given by
∑
s(1− pst+1)Lstλ. To calibrate λ
consistently, we first derive a time series measure for (1− pst+1) as the ratio of new
non-performing loans by sector over gross lending by sector.10 We then calibrate λ
as the ratio of average total loss on lending over average total non-performing
loans, (
∑
s(1− ps)Ls).
In Norway, the average original maturity of mortgages is 20 years. We assume
a uniform distribution of mortgage age structure, such that the average maturity of
mortgages outstanding is 10 years. ORBOF database provides a time series of
average (across sectors) remaining loan maturity for each banking group. We
assume that retail loans are equal to mortgages and trace out the average maturity
for C&I loans using
total maturity =
Lretail
Lretail + LC&I
(retail maturity) +
LC&I
Lretail + LC&I
(C&I maturity).
10ORBOF only provides data on new non–performing loans from 2010Q4 on. Therefore, we
impute a time series going back until 1997 by computing the fraction of new non-performing loans
in the stock of non-performing loans for the quarters available, take time average and then assume
this fraction to be the same for the quarters where no data is available.
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This yields an average C&I maturity of 4 years.
Risk weights, (wretail, wC&I , wA), are calibrated based on risk weights suggested
in Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2015). In our model securities are
safe and collateralizable assets (e.g. Triple-A rated sovereigns bonds), which have a
risk weight of 0 %. We think of retail loans mainly as longer–term mortgages,
which have a 100 % risk weight. We also assume that loans to corporate firms have
a risk weight of 100 %, which corresponds for example to small to medium revenue
firms with leverage ratios between 1 and 5.
Finally, we calibrate fixed cost κ, discount factor β, non-interest expenses
Ξ(Ls) and adjustment cost parameters {ψs}S internally. For κ we target average
return on equity of the banking group. β targets the net interest margins. For
Ξ(Ls) we assume Ξ(Ls) = c0L
2
s and calibrate c0 to target average net non-interest
expenses (over total lending). For ψs we target average volatility of the gross
lending to sector s relative to GDP during the Norwegian banking crisis of 1988 to
1993. We rule out seasoned equity offering and set equity issuance costs ν(·, ·) to
infinity.
We allow for a state-dependent capital requirement:
ϕ(z) =
ϕ¯ , if z ∈ zH , zL4.5 % , if z ∈ zC , zR ,
where ϕ¯ is the normal times capital requirement, which we vary in the exercises
below. The banking group under consideration faces a 13 % capital requirement.
Thus, in our baseline calibration we set ϕ¯ = 13 %. Table 3.3 summarizes our
preliminary calibration.
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Table 3.3: Parameter calibration: large Norwegian banking group
Parameter Calibration Target
zG good state 1 normalization
zB bad state 0.9742 Norwegian business cycle
zC crisis state 0.7944 Barro and Ursua (2008)
zR recovery state 0.9455 Barro and Ursua (2008)
dH high funding state 0.0616 funding measure
dN medium funding state 0.0513 funding measure
dL low funding state 0.0410 funding measure
rd funding costs 0.0040 avg. deposit and bond cost
ra security return 1.001×rd preliminary
rb borrowing costs ra preliminary
cretail,C&I0 non-interest expenses 0.02 NNIE
ψretail,C&I adjustment costs 4.0 variance crisis loan supply
λ loss given default 0.1796 loss on lending
mretail,C&I maturity parameter (1/17, 1/41) avg. Norwegian maturity
β discount factor 0.9901 NIM
κ fixed costs 4.96× 10−5 avg. RoE
wretail,C&I, wA risk weights [1, 1, 0] Basel III
ϕ¯ normal times cap. req. 0.13 regulatory requirement
ν(·, ·) SEO costs +∞ no SEO
The transition matrices of the two Markov processes zt and dt are given by
F(zt+1, zt) =

0.9712 0.0288 0 0
0.0288 0.9631 0.0081 0
0 0 0.8973 0.1027
0 0.1925 0 0.8075

∆(dt+1, dt) =
0.8761 0.1238 0.00010.0780 0.8439 0.0781
0.0001 0.1238 0.8761

Calibrated normal times balance sheet. Given our calibration, Table 3.4
shows targeted and non-targeted moments for the banking group.
53
CHAPTER 3. STRUCTURAL STRESS TESTS
Table 3.4: Comparing model and simulated moments
Moment Model Data
avg. normal times
targeted
RoE 0.10 0.12
NIM (retail) 0.026 0.024
NIM (C&I) 0.025 0.023
non-targeted
CET1 0.130 0.136
loans/total assets 0.78 0.66
lending rate (retail) 0.044 0.036
lending rate (C&I) 0.042 0.036
Notes: Data moments are 2001Q4-2014Q2 aver-
ages, except for RoE and core capital ration, which
are 2014Q2 observations.
3.4 Analysis of bank’s exit decision
For the remainder of the chapter, we consider a one sector version of the
model, with only retail lending. Loan demand from the C&I sector is set to zero.
Before we move to stress testing, it is worthwhile to take a closer look at the
exit decision of the bank. In our model, the exit choice plays two important roles:
first, the possibility of exit and the corresponding loss of the charter value induces
the bank to hold a precautionary equity cushion. This affects the leverage ratio and
therefore the stress performance of the bank. Second, the optimal exit choice of the
bank induces an endogenous hurdle rate to stress testing. We show that the bank
chooses to exit if its charter value is sufficiently low, which - for our calibrated bank
- only occurs during crises.11 We study the key determinants of exit decision: stress
duration and initial equity position. Throughout this section, we assume a
counterfactual capital requirement of ϕ¯ = 4.5 %, since for this requirement the
capital constraint is not binding and the bank holds excess capital (see Table 3.5
below). This allows us to counterfactually reduce bank’s equity holding below the
optimal level while not violating the regulatory requirement.
3.4.1 Exit trade-off
In standard reduced-form stress tests, the passing of a stress test is measured
against an exogenous equity threshold, referred to as hurdle rate. If the equity
projection of a bank drops below this threshold, the bank fails the test and may
have to raise additional capital. In contrast to this approach, a structural setup
11Throughout, we use the terms ’stress’ and ’crisis’ interchangeably. Both are defined as a
consecutive episode of zC and zR states.
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with endogenous exit choice offers a novel stress test metric. Instead of an
exogenous threshold, the forward-looking optimizing behavior of the bank induces
an endogenous threshold through bank’s charter value, V (a, `, z, d).
When facing the choice of whether to exit or not, the bank trades off the cost
and benefit of staying. When in crisis state zC , bank profit is negative and hence
equity falls over time. The gains from staying are associated with the profitability
of bank operations in normal times. In order to get there, however, the bank must
survive the crisis states. If the bank decides to stay, and the crisis state persists,
equity will eventually turn negative. The bank is then forced to exit under limited
liability (with value zero). In contrast, if the bank chooses to exit with positive
equity, it receives the liquidation value of assets net of external debt (see Equation
(3.15)). Hence, the cost of staying is the possible loss of liquidation value if the
crisis persists. At high levels of equity, the probability of surviving the crisis is
large and the bank prefers to stay and have the option to lend once the economy
returns to normal times. At low levels of equity, the probability of surviving is
small and the bank prefers to exit and take the liquidation value.
Figure 3.2(a) shows the exit value, W x=1(A,L, z′, d), the continuation value,
W x=0(A,L, z′, d′), and dividend payments in the crisis state zC as a function of bop
equity e. The exit value is increasing in e with slope 1 + ra. The reason is that
during crisis state return on lending is negative and thus any additional bop
resources are invested into riskless securities A, which, ceteris paribus, increases the
liquidation value of assets (see Equation (3.15)).
The continuation value is the present discounted value of future dividend
payments (see Equation (3.16)). During crisis state, but also when switching from
crisis state to the recovery state, dividend payments are zero. Therefore, the crisis
continuation value is solely driven by expected future dividend payments once the
economy returnes to normal times. In the exit region, left to the vertical line in
Panel (a), the continuation value is smaller than the exit value. The reason they
are nearly identical is that in the counterfactual case of no exit, the bank will exit
the following period if the crisis persists, such that the continuation value is simply
next period’s discounted exit value. In the continuation region the slope of the
continuation value is steeper than 1 + ra. The reason is that a higher bop equity
raises the probability of surviving the stress episode, as equity losses can be
sustained longer. This can be seen when tracing a given initial equity position over
time. Suppose we start off with an equity level in the continuation region in Panel
(a). The bank stays, and enters the next period with a lower equity level. This is
shown in Panel (b), where the policy function for e′ is below the 45 degree line. The
bank moves closer to the exit threshold, and these dynamics continue until either
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the recovery state is reached or the bank exits. Thus, a higher equity level enables
the bank to sustain more crisis state periods, which raises the continuation value.
Figure 3.2: Exit decision, ϕ¯ = 4.5 %
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Notes: policy functions evaluated for (z, z′) = (zC , zC). Value functions evaluated at heritage loan
stock state ` equal to the level after 4 quarters in crisis state zC .
Figure 3.3 shows an example crisis simulation path that leads to exit. During
zC , the fraction of non-performing loans is high, inducing low or even negative
return on lending. The bank adjusts its portfolio by reducing loan exposure, which
generates adjustment costs according to Equation (3.5), and by increasing security
holdings. The exogenous fluctuations in external funding supply are mirrored in
security holdings, as the bank holds enough securities to shield loan supply from
funding fluctuations. Since the return on securities is not high enough to
compensate external funding and fixed costs, the bank suffers equity losses when
loan exposure is near zero. Low return on safe securities, negative return on
lending and fixed cost κ deplete bank equity and hence reduce its charter value. As
long as the charter value is high enough, the bank chooses to stay in the market.
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Since the charter value captures the present value of all future dividend payments,
it is forward-looking beyond the contemporaneous stress, into periods where return
on lending is positive again and higher dividends can be paid. Exiting the loan
market implies the loss of option to participate in the market once it recovers.
However, if stress persists long enough, the continuation value eventually falls
below the exit value as the probability of surviving the stress episode, and being
able to pay positive dividends again, declines. As the figure shows, the first stress
episode is brief enough, such that the bank stays in the market. Once the first
episode of crisis states is left and the recovery state is entered, equity is gradually
rebuilt through retained earnings. However, when the second stress episode hits,
equity is still below normal times level. The second crisis turns out to be much
more persistent, such that equity and charter value are increasingly depressed and
in period 43 the bank decides to exit the market and liquidate the remaining
equity, which is still strictly positive. Therefore, for the calibrated bank and a
normal times capital requirement of 4.5 % the endogenous equity hurdle rate lies
83 % below the average normal times equity level. If during the stress horizon
equity drops below this level, the banks chooses to exit and fails the stress test.
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Figure 3.3: Exit behavior, ϕ¯ = 4.5 %
0 10 20 30 40
0.8
0.9
1
z
0 10 20 30 40
0
0.1
0.2
npl
0 10 20 30 40
0
0.05
loans
0 10 20 30 40
0
0.05
0.1
securities
0 10 20 30 40
0
1
2
x 10−4 adjustment costs
0 10 20 30 40
−0.02
0
0.02
return on lending
0 10 20 30 40
0
2
4
x 10−3 equity
0 10 20 30 40
0
0.005
0.01
charter value
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3.4.2 Determinants of exit decision
Bank’s equity level is the key determinant for the exit decision. The equity
level during stress is determined by two factors: (1) stress duration and (2) initial
equity upon stress entry.
Stress duration. To separate the effect of stress duration from
heterogeneity in initial equity position, we now only consider crises into which the
bank enters with the same initial balance sheet composition, in particular the bank
enters each crisis from zL steady state with same initial equity and external funding
supply. Moreover, we fix external funding supply to d = dN . Thus, the only source
of heterogeneity in stress outcomes is crisis duration. Figure 3.4(a) shows the
distribution of crisis state duration, given a probabilistic Markov stress scenario,
and its impact on stress outcome. Everything else equal, crisis state duration maps
directly into the bank’s equity losses during stress. The longer the crisis state
episode, the higher is the corresponding equity loss. After 9 zC periods, the bank is
almost fully invested into securities. Since ra ' rd and external funding is stable,
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cash flow is approximately given by pi′ = −κ (see Equation (3.8)). Therefore, the
bank needs to borrow short-term, which reduces next period’s equity at a constant
rate (see Equation (3.12)). With a 4.5 % capital requirement, the equilibrium
equity cushion is sufficiently thick to whether crisis state episodes of up to 23
quarters. The bank hangs on as the charter value is reduced period after period,
expecting to leave the crisis state soon. However, if the economy does not leave the
crisis state within the 23rd period, the charter value is sufficiently reduced and
equity drops below the 83 % loss threshold, such that the bank decides to exit.
This leads to a discontinuity in the duration distribution at 24 crisis state periods,
as no duration larger than 24 periods is observed.
Initial equity. The second key factor in bank’s exit decision is the initial
equity position upon stress entry. For a normal times capital requirement of 4.5 %
the bank optimally chooses to hold a zL steady state capital ratio of 9.9 % (see
Table 3.5). We compare the equity dynamics of a bank that enters a crisis with
optimal initial equity with the dynamics of a bank that enters the same crisis with
counterfactually lower initial equity. In this counterfactual scenario with reduce
equity such that the initial capital ratio is 7 % instead of 9.9 %. External funding is
again fixed at d = dN . Figure 3.4(b) shows the equity paths for the different initial
equity positions. When the bank enters the crisis with its optimal equity position,
it is robust and can sustain 23 zC periods. However, with initial equity 30 % lower,
the bank survives only 6 crisis quarters, 74 % less than under optimal equity. The
reason is that with higher initial leverage, equity is lower and depleted faster, as
the loss due to non-performing loans relative to equity is higher. The bank enters
the crisis closer to the exit region and moves faster towards it (see Figure 3.2). This
induces a non-linear dependency between initial equity level and crisis survivial
probability.
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Figure 3.4: Determinants of stress outcomes
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Notes: Panel (a): The only source of heterogeneous crisis outcomes derives from different crises
durations, i.e. the bank enters each crisis with same balance sheet composition (from zL steady
state). Red vertical line indicates mean. Panel (b): ’optimal initial equity’ corresponds to to zL
steady state equity holdings upon crisis entry. ’Low initial equity’ corresponds to initial equity
30 % below optimum, while loan stock remains unchanged. External funding is fixed at d = dN .
3.5 Structural stress testing
In this section we perform stress tests in our quantitative model using balance
sheet and income information for a Norwegian bank. We first study bank resilience
to a probabilistic crisis scenario for different counterfactual capital requirements
and elaborate on the incentives for excess capital holdings. We then quantitatively
analyze bank behavior during three stress scenarios that feature different degrees of
severity and explore the effect of exit. Finally, we contrast structural stress testing
with a stylized non-structural stress test following the CLASS methodology (Hirtle,
Kovner, Vickery, and Bhanot, 2014).
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3.5.1 Capital regulation and bank resilience
Current stress test analyses derive capital shortfalls relying on a combination
of exogenous assumptions and reduced-form relationships, and cannot account for
bank expectations and endogenous bank exit. In this section we use our structural
model to study how expectations and counterfactual regulatory regimes affect i)
bank resilence (measured as exit probablity) during stress and ii) banks incentive
to self-insure through an endogenous capial buffer.
Capital regulation affects stress outcomes through the effect on bank’s
precautionary equity choice during normal times. Precautionary equity has two
functions: (1) it reduces the likelihood of exit during stress and loosing the charter
value, and (2) it protects the bank from facing a binding capital constraint in the
aftermath of a crisis, when equity remains low but return on lending is positive
again.
Expecting the crisis state. To shed light on the first function, we conduct
the following stress exercise: We seed the bank in zL steady state, and assume that
the bank enters the crisis state at the end of period one. Then we simulate a time
series of 120 periods letting zt and dt fluctuate according to their respective Markov
processes. We repeat this procedure 1000 times and compute the probability of exit
as the fraction of crisis occurrences that lead to exit12. Table 3.5 illustrates how
regulation affects bank robustness (measured as the likelihood of exit during a
crisis) under two alternative assumptions on bank rationality. In the benchmark
case (Panel a) of rational expectations, the bank internalizes the crisis state
probability (according to transition matrix F) and thus has an incentive to
self-insure by accumulating capital. In the alternative case (Panel b) the bank
believes that there is zero probability of going from normal times to a crisis state
(qLC = 0). This mutes the incentive to hold capital to protect the charter value as
the bank believes there is a zero probability of exit.
Absent any regulatory requirements, the bank chooses to hold positive equity.
For ϕ¯ = ϕ = 0, the unregulated bank endogenously accumulates a capital ratio of
8.8 % to shield its charter value from crises. However, the bank does not find it
optimal to accumulate sufficient capital to eliminate exit probability completely,
and exits on average in 60 % of probabilistic crises. When the bank does not expect
to enter a crisis, the self-insurance motive disappears and capital holdings are zero.
In this case, exit happens immediately upon crisis entry. The intuition behind this
result is that, absent crises, the marginal benefit of capital accumulation is to raise
next period dividends with (1 + ra) at the marginal cost of −1 lower dividends
12If zt enters the crisis state multiple times (e.g. 3 times) within the 120 period span, this is
counted as 3 crisis occurrences.
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today. Given our parameter values, we have that the discounted marginal benefit of
retaining earnings exceeds the cost, β(1 + ra) < 1. When the bank takes crises
events into account, however, there is an additional gain from capital accumulation
due to its insurance value. This explains the interior solution for capital holdings
for the rational expectations bank.
With regulation, the rational expectation bank (Panel a) chooses to hold a
buffer above the regulatory level. For a capital requirement in normal times of
ϕ¯ = 4.5 % the bank holds a 9.9 % capital ratio, which is even higher than what the
unregulated bank holds. This is explained by an interaction effect between
regulation and capital accumulation, i.e. the second role of the precautionary
buffer: the bank accumulates additional capital to reduce the likelihood of facing a
binding capital constraint after a crisis, when equity is still low but return on
lending is positive again (see below). Excess capital is, however, decreasing
monotonically in ϕ¯, such that for high enough requirements the precautionary
capital holding disappears and the capital constraint is binding. For the baseline
normal times capital requirement of ϕ¯ = 13 % the bank holds no excess capital.
Finally, Table 3.5 illustrates that tighter regulation indeed makes the bank
more robust to crises, as can be seen by the negative relationship between normal
times capital requirements and exit probability. Panel (b) highlights the role of
expectations. When the bank is not expecting crises it chooses to be exactly at the
capital requirement, i.e. it does not hold any voluntary excess capital. This implies
high ex-post exit rates, especially for low capital requirements.
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Table 3.5: Effect of capital regulation and crisis expectation
Capital Requirement
ϕ¯ normal (%) 13 7 4.5 0
ϕ stress (%) 4.5 4.5 4.5 0
(a) Rational Bank
capital ratio (%) 13 10.5 9.9 8.8
excess capital (%) 0 50 120 –
P(exit|crisis) (%) 4 14 27 60
(b) Myopic Bank
capital ratio (%) 13 7 4.5 0
excess capital (%) 0 0 0 –
P(exit|crisis) (%) 4 93 98 100
Notes: Probabilistic stress scenario within a 120
periods time frame. Average of 1000 simulations.
Exit probability reflects heterogeneity in initial eq-
uity position, crisis duration and external funding
realizations. Excess capital computed as percent-
age deviation of capital ratio from regulatory re-
quirement.
The role of recovery. To elaborate on the second role of precautionary
equity, we consider a situation where the bank initially enters the crisis with an
equity level below the zL steady state level and track equity and loan supply
dynamics during the crisis. The bank understands that once the economy fully
recovers from a crisis, lending supply can be constrained by the state-dependent
capital requirement, as equity is still depressed while the capital requirement
increases back to normal times level. This induces a positive shadow value on
equity in normal times.
In Figure 3.5 we consider the same two scenarios as in Section 3.4.2 with
ϕ¯ = 4.5 %: (1) the bank enters the crisis with zL optimal balance sheet composition
corresponding to a capital ratio of 9.9 % and (2) the bank enters the crisis with a
capital ratio of only 7 %, such that given same initial heritage loan stock equity is
lower. The bank enters a stress episode of 6 quarters consisting of four crisis and
two recovery states. Panel (a) shows the equity paths and Panel (b) lending
behavior and the upper bound on lending implied by the capital constraints.
In scenario (1), the endogenous buffer chosen by the bank is sufficiently large
to allow the bank to return to its optimal lending level once the crisis is over. In
scenario (2) the equity build-up after the crisis is much more sluggish. The reason
is that with a lower capital ratio of 7 %, loan supply is constrained by low equity
after the crisis (see Panel (b)). This triggers an adverse dynamic multiplier effect
once the crisis state is left: since equity is low the capital constraint is binding and
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thus loan supply is lower than optimal. In turn, low loan supply, despite positive
return on lending, slows down equity build-up, which makes the capital constraint
bind longer. To insure against this possibility, the bank has an incentive to hold
higher equity in normal times, such that, for the expected crisis duration and for
the expected ratio of zC/zR, equity is sufficiently high to avoid being capital
constrained during normal times when lending is profitable.
Figure 3.5: Recovery expectation, ϕ¯ = 4.5 %
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3.5.2 Capital regulation and equilibrium loan supply
The reduction of excess capital holdings in response to tighter capital
requirements ϕ¯ has implication for bank’s optimal equilibrium loan supply choice.
Figure 3.6 shows zL steady state loan supply (relative to ϕ¯ = 0 % s.s. loan
supply) and excess capital holdings (relative to capital requirement) as a function
of capital requirement ϕ¯. All other parameters remain at their baseline calibration
(Table 4.1). As discussed above excess capital holdings are decreasing
monotonically in ϕ¯. Up to ϕ¯ = 11 % the bank hold excess capital, such that
equilibrium loan supply is independent of ϕ¯. For ϕ¯ > 11 % the capital requirement
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is binding such that equilibrium loan supply decreases in ϕ¯. Therefore, the
calibrated bank is sufficient impatient such that it does not find it optimal to
accumulate enough equity to keep equilibrium loan supply constant at high ϕ¯. As a
result, in our model the effect of capital regulation on loan supply is not strictly
monotonic. For low ϕ¯ the bank’s self-insurance motive induces excess capital
holdings. As long as the requirement is not binding, an increase in ϕ¯ reduces excess
equity holdings but has no effect on loan supply.
Figure 3.6: Lending and capital regulation
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3.5.3 Fixed scenario stress test
Stress projections. We conduct a stress test for the calibrated single bank
from Table 4.1 with the current 13 % capital requirement. In contrast to Section
3.4, we now consider a deterministic stress scenario instead of a probabilistic one,
i.e. we fix the path of zt to a deterministic sequence of zC and zR. The aim is to
study bank resilience to a specific, calibrated stress scenario, as common in
state-of-the-are stress tests. We consider three different stress scenarios. Each
scenario has a duration of three years and we fix the path of the aggregate state z
to a deterministic sequence of zC and zR in the simulation.
13 We consider a mild
scenario with one year in crisis state zC and two years of recovery zR, a severe
scenario with two years in crisis and one year of recovery and a double-dip scenario
with 6 quarters in state zC , one quarters recovery zR and one quarter in zL and
again 4 quarters in zC . For each scenario the bank enters the stress from the
13Note that fixing a z-path does not imply that the bank has perfect foresight about this path. It
will still hold rational expectations given the switching probabilities F(z′, z). However, for a fixed
crisis path there is no exit probability. A given crisis path either leads to exit or not.
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stochastic zL steady state. External funding supply dynamics are unconstrained
and follow the Markov process with transition matrix ∆(dt+1, dt). To compute
stress projections, we average over 1000 simulations paths to smooth out
idiosyncratic fluctuations of external funding supply.
We find that the calibrated bank does not exit in neither of the three
scenarios. Figure 3.7 shows the predicted equity and loan supply paths for the
three scenarios. Under the mild and severe scenario, equity reaches its trough
during the last crisis state zC and gradually starts increasing again as soon as the
recovery state is reached. Under the double-dip scenario, equity recovers marginally
during the brief recovery, but is then depleted again as the economy return to
crisis. Our model predicts the bank to be very robust. It would only choose to exit
if the single crisis would last for 40 quarters, or - under the double dip-scenario -
the second crisis would last for 20 quarters. In all three scenarios the bank reduces
loan supply during the stress horizon, but also responds to a recovery by a steep
increase in lending.
Figure 3.7: Stress test projections, ϕ¯ = 13 %
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Table 3.6(a) summarizes key stress test results. Given that non-performing
loans increase strongly to 14 % in the crisis state, even under the mild scenario the
bank suffers substantial equity losses, which can only partially recovered during the
recovery phase (end of scenario). Crucially, the bank deleverages during stress.
Therefore, the capital ratio increases during the crisis state, such that the crisis
capital requirement (4.5 %) is not binding. Once the recovery sets in the banks
extends loan supply such that for the monotonic mild and severe scenario, the
lending reduction is attenuated at end of scenario relative to crisis trough. Since
during recover return on lending is positive then bank can rebuild equity through
retained earnings.
To highlight the flexibility of our structural stress testing framework relative to
state-of-the-art approaches, Table 3.6(b) shows quantitative stress test results for
the same bank but for a counterfactually lower normal times capital requirement of
ϕ¯ = 4.5 %.14 The looser regulated bank would be less robust to stress. Equity
losses would be higher for all three scenarios, as the bank is leveraged higher than
under the ϕ¯ = 13 % requirement. After the crisis state is left, the bank can extend
loan supply faster as it only has to satisfy a 4.5 % normal times requirement and is
thus less constrained by equity. In the double-dip scenario the bank chooses to exit
during the second quarter of the second crisis, leading to a full loss of equity for the
financial institution. In this scenario, the bank would fail the stress test according
to the endogenous hurdle rate.
Table 3.6: Stress test results
(a) ϕ¯ = 13 % (b) ϕ¯ = 4.5 %
Stress Scenario mild severe double-dip mild severe double-dip
(I) Equity Reduction
maximum −40 % −50 % −65 % −53 % −67 % −100 %
end of scenario −36 % −48 % −65 % −48 % −65 % −100 %
(II) Loan Reduction
maximum −61 % −89 % −85 % −62 % −91 % −100 %
end of scenario −33 % −45 % −85 % −18 % −24 % −100 %
(III) Capital ratio
at trough 21 % 62 % 33 % 13 % 38 % 20 %
end of scenario 12 % 12 % 30 % 6 % 5 % –
Exit No No No No No Yes
14To generate the stress projections, we resolve the model with ϕ¯ = 4.5 %. We therefore neglect
any transitional dynamics from ϕ¯ = 13 % to ϕ¯ = 4.5 %.
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Endogenous hurdle rate. As highlighted in Section 4.5 the exit choice of
the bank induces an endogenous hurdle rate to the stress test. The reason is that if
equity (and thus the charter value) drops below a certain threshold, the bank
prefers to liquidate the balance sheet and exit the market than continuing under
adverse market conditions, as the expected reduction of the liquidation value is
dominates the probability of participating in the next recovery. To study how the
endogenous threshold affects stress test results, we do the following stress test
experiment: we consider a panel of 21 independent banking groups with fixed
external funding, dit = di,∀t.15 Banking groups are identical except for their
constant level of external funding, which is heterogeneous across groups. We take
{di}21i=1 to by equidistantly distributed in the interval [0.008, 0.048]. The different
external funding supply induces heterogeneity in balance sheet composition and
capital ratio, as -all else being equal- banks with low di supply less loans relative to
their equity and therefore feature a higher capital ratio.
We consider two different scenarios: (1) we generate stress test projections for
all banking groups according to our full fledged model including the optimal exit
choice and (2) we generate stress projections from a version of the model without
endogenous exit. Whenever the bank would choose to exit, we ignore this and
update the security state a according to b′ = −pi′ ⇒ a′ = A+ (1 + rb)pi′, i.e.
assuming zero dividend. Consequently, banks continue independently of their
equity position, which, as in standard stress tests, could potentially turn negative.
Consequently, in this scenario there is no endogenous hurdle rate as banks cannot
exit. To generate exit despite a high capital requirement of ϕ¯ = 13 % we consider a
stress scenario of 28 zC quarters for both scenarios. To highlight the role of the
endogenous hurdle rate, we also introduce an exogenous hurdle rate on equity for
this stress test. We set this threshold to the equity level necessary for the bank in
the panel with the lowest zL steady state loan supply, L¯
zL , to be able to maintain
this loan supply at the crisis capital requirement of 4.5 %, i.e.
hurdle rate = 0.045×min
i
{
L¯zLi
}
This allows banks with higher ex-ante loan supply to deleverage, while imposing an
upper bound on aggregate deleveraging. Banks with equity levels below this
threshold are not able to maintain the minimum normal times loan supply such
that they would have to deleverage stronger than deemed appropriate, e.g. because
of macroeconomic concerns such as spillover effects to the real economy.
15Banks are independent in the sense that each bank’s market share σ is still computed under
the assumption that all other banks set rLs = r¯
L
s (see Section 3.3.1). One can think about that as
each bank being in a different segment of the loan market.
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The top row of Figure 3.8 shows the ex-post equity and equity loss distribution
for the scenario with endogenous exit. Due to the dispersion in equity and portfolio
composition, there is no single endogenous hurdle rate at which all banks opt for
exit, but an endogenous hurdle region. This is indicated by the red area in Panel
(a). The upper bound of this region is determined by the bank in the panel that
chooses to exit with the highest equity level. Vice versa, the lower bound is
determined by the bank in the panel that optimally exits with the lowest equity.
With optimal exit choice, 29 % of banks will choose to exit during the stress
horizon (6 out of 21 banks), while 71 % of banks remain in the market, suffering
equity losses between 69 % and 75 %. The dashed line in Panel (a) indicates the
exogenous equity hurdle rate below which the bank is labeled as failing the stress
test. For the unconditional distribution the mean equity loss is 79 % under optimal
exit behavior (as indicated by the red line in Panel (b)).
The bottom row of Figure 3.8 shows ex-post equity and equity loss
distributions for the second scenario, where we ignore exit. Exit affects the shape
of the ex-post equity distribution. The equity distributions in Panels (a) and (c) to
the right of the optimal exit region are identical, since banks with equity in this
region do not exit. Inside and to the left of the optimal exit region, the
distributions are, however, quite different. In the scenario with exit, the
distribution features a discontinuity at the beginning of the exit region, since banks
choose to exit with positive equity and exit leads to the full loss of equity for the
banking group. In contrast, in the scenario without exit, equity is mechanically
iterated forward over time such that this discontinuity at the exit region does not
occur. As a result, at end of stress horizon, banks with positive equity are observed
that would have liquidated their balance sheet in the version with exit. This leads
to a downward bias of projected equity losses. As can be seen in Panels (b) and (d)
of Figure 3.8, for our numerical example the unconditional mean equity loss with
exit is 79 % and only 72 % in the model without exit, about 10 % lower.
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Figure 3.8: Effect of endogenous exit
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Notes: Stress test for a panel of 21 banks with heterogeneous but constant external funding
supply di and 28 period zC stress scenario.
In the scenario without exit, at end of stress horizon, banks with positive
equity below the optimal exit region are observed in the panel. Consequently banks
may be considered passing the stress test, according to the exogenous hurdle rate,
that would have preferred to exit if able to. This harbors the possibility of
committing an error of second type if the null that a bank is passing the stress test
is falsely accepted. This is the case if the exogenous hurdle rate lies to the left of
the exit region, as in our numerical example. Given the exogenous threshold, only
5 % of banks in the panel (1 out of 21) would fail the stress test. However, 29 % of
banks (6 out of 21) exit during the stress horizon in the scenario with exit.16
Consequently 24 % of banks (5 out of 21) in the panel would be labeled as passing
the stress test according to the exogenous hurdle rate, that would in fact leave the
16Note that if the bank could not satisfy the crisis capital requirement it would face a penalty.
Thus, on equilibrium path the capital requirement is never violated as the bank exits prior to
violating the constraint. Therefore, no exit always implies satisfying the capital constraint.
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market during the stress horizon of we allow for exit.17 Table 3.7 summarizes the
quantitative stress outcomes for the simulations with and without endogenous exit
choice.
Table 3.7: Exit decision and stress test results
Fraction of banks ∆
. . . (a) endogenously exiting 29 %
. . . (b) failing stress test 5 % −83 %
. . . (c) passing but exiting 24 %
Ex-post aggregate equity
. . . (a) exit −79 %
. . . (b) no exit −72 % −10 %
3.5.4 Comparison with a stylized non-structural stress
test
State-of-the-art models for micro- and macroprudential stress tests derive
capital shortfalls during counterfactual scenarios relying (1) on a combination of
exogenous, behavioral rules and (2) reduced-form relationships extrapolated from
historical data. This section studies qualitative and quantitative differences
between a reduced-form and our structural approach to stress testing. To this end,
we perform a stylized non-structural stress test following the CLASS methodology
(Hirtle, Kovner, Vickery, and Bhanot, 2014), using our model as the true
data-generating process. This way, we can evaluate the projections of the CLASS
methodology using optimal model behavior as benchmark.
The CLASS model employs granular balance sheet and income data to
generate capital projections under stress (see Hirtle, Kovner, Vickery, and Bhanot,
2014, p.42). Since the bank in our model is more stylized, we cannot replicate their
approach one-to-one, but focus on variables, which are featured both in the CLASS
model and in our model. In particular, for the key income ratios, we consider net
interest margin (nim), net charge-off rate (nco) and non-interest expenses ratio
17Given that equity is decreasing monotonically during the stress horizon, the equity distribution
in Panel (c) is a lower bound to the equity distribution with exit. Thus, banks that lie in the equity
region between the solid and dashed line did not exit with equity lower than the one observed in
Panel (c).
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(cost). In our model, these variables are defined as
nimt =
∑
S r
L
stp
′
stLst + r
aAt − rddt − rbB′t∑
S Lst + At
ncot =
∑
S(1− p′stλs)Lst∑
S Lst
costt =
∑
S [Ξ(Lst) + Ψ(Lst)] + κ∑
S Lst + At
To generate the non-structural stress projections of capital, we proceed as follows:
first, we simulate long times series for the key income ratios conditional on normal
times fluctuations (z ∈ {zH , zL}) using our calibrated model.18 Second, we estimate
a simple ARX(1) model on the banking group level (see Hirtle, Kovner, Vickery,
and Bhanot, 2014, p.8)
yt = β0 + β1yt−1 + β2zt + t , yt ∈ {nimt, ncot, costt} (3.21)
on the model-generated time series.
Third, we impose auxiliary behavioral assumptions on balance sheet
composition and dividend policy.19 We assume that the asset composition and
external funding supply remains unchanged during stress. Given endogenous equity
stress dynamics, we assume that the asset size adjusts such that the balance sheet
identify is satisfied in every quarter of the stress horizon.20 As mentioned in Hirtle,
Kovner, Vickery, and Bhanot (2014), the stress projections under the
non-structural approach are susceptible to the initial seed. We seed nim0, nco0 and
cost0 in the zL stochastic steady state of the model. The constant asset
composition A?/
∑
S L
?
s ≡ ρ, initial equity e0 and dividends D0 are taken from the
same steady state. During the stress horizon we fix external funding supply to
18We use normal times fluctuations only, since historical banking data features only very limited
crises observations, if any.
19Regulators often focus on credit sustainability during stress to limited the spill-over of financial
turmoil to borrowers through deleveraging (for a recent example see Bank of England, 2015). These
scenarios are designed to be conservative in the sense that they reverse-engineer the ex-ante equity
level necessary for banks not drop below the exogenous equity threshold under the constant loan
supply assumption despite negative return on lending. For the 2011 and 2014 euro-area-wide stress
test banks’ portfolio size was set to remain constant during the stress horizon (European Banking
Authority, 2011, 2014). Our benchmark, the CLASS model, assumes that bank’s balance sheet
continues growing by 1.25 % per quarter and that portfolio shares remain constant under stress.
20Since our model is stationary, we abstract from balance sheet growth during stress. Moreover,
we fix external funding supply during the stress horizon. To make optimal behavior and reduced-
form projected behavior comparable, we impose the same assumption under reduced-from behavior.
Then total assets have to adjust.
72
3.5. STRUCTURAL STRESS TESTING
d = dN . The auxiliary assumption on balance sheet composition then implies∑
S
Lst =
et + d
(1 + ρ)
(3.22)
At = ρ
∑
S
Lst (3.23)
For dividend policy we impose the original CLASS assumption
Dt = max {0, 0.9Dt−1 + (1− 0.9) (D?t −Dt−1)} (3.24)
with D?t = 0.45pit being the dividend target and pit being profits. Table 3.8 shows
the estimation results for the three variables in Equation (3.21).
Table 3.8: ARX(1) estimation results
yit
nim nco cost
constant β0 −0.0038??? 0.0101??? −0.0008???
yit−1 β1 0.7712??? 0.3677??? 0.8694???
zt β2 0.0050
??? −0.0092??? 0.0010???
R2 0.64 0.99 0.79
Notes: model-generates time series on normal time fluc-
tuations (z ∈ {zH , zL}). No. of obs. = 69,800.
In our model, during normal times all three income ratios are significantly
autocorrelated. Especially, the net interest margin and the cost measure behave
sluggishly due to stable portfolio choices. Net interest margin and costs behave
pro-cyclically, whereas charge-offs are countercyclical.
We apply this three–stage algorithm to to a 3 year stress scenario, zˆ, with 8
quarters in zC followed by 4 quarters in zR. Then, given Equations (3.21)–(3.24)
and initial seeds, we compute projected equity dynamics for the stress scenario as
yˆt = β0 + β1yˆt−1 + β2zˆt , yˆt ∈ { ˆnimt, nˆcot, ˆcostt} (3.25)
pit = ( ˆnimt − ˆcostt)
[∑
S
Lst + At
]
− nˆcot
∑
S
Lst (3.26)
et+1 = et + pit −Dt (3.27)
To understand how the auxiliary behavioral rules and the reduced–form
regressions affect stress test results, we contrast three different scenarios. In the
first scenario, the structural approach, we compute stress projections using the
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policy functions from our structural model. In the second scenario, the CLASS
approach, we consider the full-fledge CLASS design described by Equations
(3.21)–(3.27). To better understand what drives the difference between the CLASS
approach and the structural model we also consider a third scenario. In this
scenario, the rules only approach, we keep the auxiliary behavioral assumptions
from the CLASS approach (Equations (3.22)–(3.24)), but let the net interest
margin, charge offs and expenses be determined by our structural model. Figure
3.9 shows the stress test projections for the three different scenarios.
Under optimal behavior stress dynamics are strongly non-linear. Profits are
substantially reduced on crisis impact due to the spike in non-performing loans.
Negative profits translate to an immediate reduction in dividends to almost zero.
To reduce its exposure to negative return loans, the bank has decreased loan supply
by 89 % at crisis trough after 8 quarters. Still, equity is significantly reduced. After
9 stress quarters it is depleted by 50 % and at the end of the stress scenario equity
is still 44 % below the pre–crisis level.
In the ’rules only’ approach, reduction in bank loan supply is constrained by
Equation (3.22). Loan supply falls with only 7 %, implying that the bank has a high
exposure to loans with negative return. This amplifies the drop in profits, which
are consequently more negative under the rules only scenario than in the optimal
scenario. Moreover, due to the persistent dividend rule (Equation (3.24)), dividends
are higher. Both higher dividends and lower profits lead to a stronger equity
reduction compared to the optimal scenario. By the end of the stress-horizon, the
equity drop is 55 % higher in the ’rules only’ approach. Consequently, by restricting
banks margins of adjustment during stress, regulators may significantly
overestimate the capital shortfall and need for costly re-capitalization.
In the CLASS approach, stress dynamics a very different compared to the
above two scenarios. Due to highly persistent key income ratios, estimated on
normal times simulated data, profits move sluggishly. On crisis impact, profits drop
10 times more in structural approach compared to the CLASS approach. The
higher profit path induces higher dividend payments through the auxiliary dividend
rule. For the equity dynamics, the positive effect of higher profits outweighs the
negative effect of higher dividends. At the end of the stress horizon the equity drop
is 50 % lower than in the structural approach. The fact that key income ratios are
persistent in normal times induces the CLASS approach, which extrapolates
normal times behavior into the stress test, to also project sluggish stress dynamics.
If the stress episode is severe and non–linear this may lead regulators to
significantly underestimate the equity loss. This exercise highlights the importance
of capturing the non-linearities associated with adverse tail events.
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Figure 3.9: Stress projections: optimal behavior versus reduced from approach
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structural model. ’rules only’: auxiliary assumptions only, Equations (3.22)–(3.24)
3.6 Conclusion
We propose a structural banking model for microprudential stress testing. We
derive bank behavior during stress as the endogenous outcome of a bank’s dynamic
optimization problem, including an exit decision. In contrast to reduced-form
frameworks, the structural model identifies the effect of regulatory parameters on
bank behavior. This allows us to gauge bank’s capital adequacy during stress
scenarios that do not only feature counterfactual macro dynamics but also
counterfactual regulatory parameters, like risk weights and capital requirements.
We use the endogenous exit probability as a novel, forward looking stress test
metric when assessing the sufficiency of banks equity holdings under stress
scenarios. For a the calibrated bank the exit probability is 4 % for a probabilistic
Markov stress scenario and it does not exit during fixed-duration three year stress
scenarios with different severity. For counterfactually lower capital requirements
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the exit probability of the calibrated bank goes up to 27 % at the minimum Basel
III capital requirement of 4.5 % and the bank would exit the market during a
double-dip scenario. Moreover, we show that looking only at equity shortfalls below
an exogenous equity threshold (’hurdle rate’) to measure capital adequacy can be
misleading, if the bank optimally exits above this threshold. Since exit leads to full
loss of equity for the financial institution, stress testing frameworks that does not
allow for endogenous exit may lead to biased projections of ex-post equity
distributions.
In our model the bank rationally anticipates the likelihood of stress. This
affects both normal times and stress behavior. During normal times the bank has
an incentive to hold a buffer stock of capital above regulatory requirements to
reduce the likelihood of exit and of being capital constrained during once the stress
is over. These excess capital holdings are decreasing in the capital requirement. At
the baseline capital requirement of 13 % the capital constraint is binding. However,
when we counterfactually set the capital requirement to 0 % the optimal capital
ratio is 8.8 %. Once the capital requirement is binding further regulatory tightening
constraints bank’s loan supply.
We contrast our structural stress test results with those of a stylized
non-structural stress test. Following the CLASS approach, we show that stress tests
that are based on the extrapolation of historical correlations, can substantially
underestimate equity losses during stress. Sluggish normal times dynamics of bank
variables carry over to stress dynamics and therefore miss potential non-linearities
during the stress event. We find that for the same stress scenario, the structural
stress test, which is based on optimal behavior of the bank, projects equity to drop
twice as strong as projected under the stylized CLASS approach.
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Bank Capital Regulation and
Regulatory Arbitrage
Denn die einen sind im Dunkeln
und die andern sind im Licht
und man siehet die im Lichte
die im Dunkeln sieht man nicht.
– Bertolt Brecht, Dreigroschenoper
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4.1 Introduction
The Basel III Accord aims at increasing micro and macro financial stability
through the introduction of additional layers of hard and soft capital requirements.
The effects of capital regulation on bank stability and credit supply have been a
focal point of discussion in the banking literature. However, with an active
secondary market for bank–originated loans, capital regulation can affect another
dimension of bank behavior: as banks have to hold more equity against a given
asset portfolio, return on equity in the traditional banking system is put under
stress and incentives to shift activity off-balance-sheet and into the unregulated
shadow system increase. The rise of hold-to-distribute banking is well documented
(European Central Bank, 2008; Bord and Santos, 2012). Still, the quantitative
effect of capital regulation on the trade–off between hold-to-maturity (HTM) and
hold-to-distribute (HTD) and the implications for optimal capital requirements
have so far been neglected in the literature. This chapter makes a first step towards
closing this gap.
To this end, I study optimal behavior of a commercial bank in the presence of
a secondary market for bank–originated loans. The dynamic, partial equilibrium
model is based on Corbae, D’Erasmo, Galaasen, Irarrazabal, and Siemsen (2015)
(see Chapter 3) and can be summarized according to four features: first, a single,
regulated bank with market power is exposed to idiosyncratic and aggregate credit
risk and endogenously chooses its portfolio allocation. Second, the bank can
conduct regulatory arbitrage by selling risky loans to the secondary market with
recourse at an endogenous price. Thereby, it reduces regulatory capital
requirements and exposure to idiosyncratic risk, but is susceptible to secondary
market distress due to recourse. Third, the bank neglects the tail risk of a systemic
secondary market crisis and can thus be confronted with unexpected high recourse
exposures. And fourth, the unregulated secondary market pools loans to diversify
idiosyncratic credit risk but it is exposed to aggregate risk.
In the model, the magnitude of regulatory arbitrage is an endogenous function
of the capital requirement. Since tighter capital regulation reduces return on
equity, the bank has a stronger incentive to sell self–originated loans to the
secondary market, to reduce risk–weighted assets, as regulatory pressure increases.
Similar to Gennaioli, Shleifer, and Vishny (2013), when selling assets to the
secondary market, the sponsoring bank neglects the tail event of systemic
secondary market distress. It expects the secondary market to be stable due to its
pooling technology, such that expected recourse transfers from the bank to the
secondary market are perceived to be low. However, the secondary market is not as
stable as perceived by the bank. There exists a state of the world in which the
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pooling technology only operates at high costs and recourse transfers are large.
This state is neglected by the bank when choosing optimal sales to the secondary
market. Gennaioli, Shleifer, and Vishny (2013) provide reasons why this may be
the case. First, there are few historically experiences of systemic secondary market
distress, such that the pricing of this risk is difficult. Second, the securitization
technology was (falsely) perceived to produce substitutes for safe bonds, such that
exposure to structured financial products was regarded as low risk and the price of
these products did not reflect the attached risk appropriately.
If there is a zero probability of secondary market distress, such that all recourse
transfers would be rationally expected by the bank and internalized in optimal
behavior, the possibility to sell loans reduces bank’s exposure to idiosyncratic
credit risk as well as risk–weighted assets, hence increasing return on equity. In this
scenario, the presence of the secondary market can increase both bank stability and
charter value. However, with a positive probability of secondary market distress,
which is neglected by sponsoring banks, the stability-increasing effect may be
eliminated. Recourse sales of loans increase bank’s exposure to systemic risk, which
is not covered by equity. In this case, bank stability may decrease. This induces
non–monotonicity on the social optimal level of capital regulation, since, with a
fragile secondary market, tighter regulation increases bank’s incentive to engage in
regulatory arbitrage, and thus its exposure to uncovered systemic risk, while also
increasing its equity cushion for on–balance–sheet assets, compensating (partially)
for higher risks hidden in the shadows.
Using data from the FDIC’s Call and Thrift reports, I study the effect of
capital regulation on a bank incentive to engage in regulatory arbitrage. The main
results are threefold: first, the presence of a secondary market for bank-originated
loans allows banks with low equity to operate in the loan market. These banks
would otherwise exit the market as their constrained optimal portfolio allocation
cannot cover deposit and fixed costs. Second, with a secondary market, the capital
constraint can induce a binding upper bound on on-balance sheet loans. In this
case, the capital requirement limits bank’s exposure to idiosyncratic credit risk, but
encourages exposure to systemic secondary market distress, which is not covered by
risk–bearing equity. This can be detrimental to bank stability, as third, the model
suggests a non-linear effect of capital regulation on HTD loans. For a capital
requirement below 13 %, increases in the requirement raise the social value of the
bank as they increase bank equity and reduce deposit insurance costs. The increase
in HTD loans is moderate. For a capital requirement above 13 %, the social value
of the bank is decreasing in the requirement, as the increase in the fraction of HTD
loans becomes steeper, reducing equity, charter value and raising insurance costs.
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Crucially, for a capital requirement above 17 % the fraction of HTD loans jumps
from 40 % to 80 %. The corresponding reduction in equity (−59 %), despite higher
regulatory requirements, reduces bank stability, bank charter value (−27 %) and
raises deposit insurance costs (+43 %), such that the social value of the bank
decreases even below that of an unregulated bank. Therefore, with the possibility
to engage in regulatory arbitrage, the model speaks in favor of an idiosyncratic
capital requirement in the region of 13 %, but below 17 %, for the average
FDIC-insured bank.
Related literature This chapter is related to two strands of literature: the
literature on shadow bank activities of commercial banks and the literature of
optimal minimum capital regulation. For the former, it draws upon Gennaioli,
Shleifer, and Vishny (2013), who study endogenous bank interconnectedness
through securitization activity. They show, in a three–period model with
idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks, that asset pooling, to hedge idiosyncratic risk,
can increase systemic risk as balance sheets become more correlated in case of an
aggregate shock if investors neglect tail risks. Since in their model banks do not
hold equity, there is no role for bank default and capital regulation, which are in
the center of my analysis.
Similar, in Martinez-Miera and Repullo (2015), banks’ optimization problem is
static, such that there is no bank equity and regulation. In their model, shadow
banks emerge endogenously if banks choose not to monitor a given loan, which will
be the case if the loan is originated for HTD. The authors show in a two–period
model that since monitoring is costly, a reduction in saving rate (e.g. due to a
saving glut) reduces monitoring incentives and thus increases the size of the shadow
market. This increases financial instability and saws the seed for the next bust.
On the empirical side this chapter is related to Acharya, Schnabl, and Suarez
(2013) who show that prior to the financial crisis, commercial banks set up ABCP
conduits to engage in regulatory arbitrage with explicit recourse through liquidity
guarantees. They find that banks with lower equity were more likely to sponsor a
conduit and that investors experienced only very low losses during the shadow
bank run, i.e. that most losses remained with the sponsoring commercial bank. By
quantifying the value of the bank that engages in sales with recourse, I also
contribute to the analysis in Calomiris and Mason (2004), who argue that
regulatory arbitrage through asset sales with recourse may lead to efficient use of
scarce bank capital if capital regulation is excessively high.
For the second strand, this chapter considers the effect of bank capital
regulation on banks’ trade–off between HTM and HTD. Since the seminal
contribution of van den Heuvel (2008) a literature on optimal bank capital
80
4.2. STYLIZED DATA FACTS
requirements developed, which I cannot do justice here. De Nicolo, Gamba, and
Lucchetta (2014) analyze the interaction of the different Basel III regulatory tools
in a structural, partial equilibrium model of a representative bank with a
parsimonious loan profit function that does, unlike this model, not explicitly model
credit default. They show that an optimal minimum capital requirement exists and
that liquidity requirements always reduce lending, while both are
efficiency–dominated by prompt corrective actions. In a medium–scale DSGE
model with costly state verification and bank default, Clerc, Derviz, Mendicino,
Moyen, Nikolov, Stracca, Suarez, and Vardoulakis (2015) also find that welfare
benefits are concave with respect to minimum capital requirements. Due to the
complexity of the model, it is solved by first–order perturbation around a steady
state in which the capital requirement is binding. Egan, Hortacsu, and Matvos
(2015) study the liability side of banks’ balance sheets within a quantitative
framework. Banks engage in imperfect competition among insured and non–insured
deposits. They show that the relationship between bank stability and welfare is
non–monotonic and that too low capital requirements may be welfare detrimental
as banks have too little skin in the game. My model draws extensively upon Corbae
and D’Erasmo (2014). Their paper analyzes the effect of capital requirements
within a model of the banking industry, where big banks engage in strategic
interaction with fringe banks. In their model higher capital requirements make
incumbent banks more stable but reduce competition such that loan rates increase.
4.2 Stylized data facts
This section provides a brief overview of bank capital regulation and the
secondary market for bank–originated loans in the US, which will be at the core of
the model analysis. Figure 4.1(a) shows the median common tier 1 capital ratio of
FDIC-insured banks together with common tier 1 minimum equity requirements as
suggested under the Basel Accords.
Bank hold substantial excess capital buffers. For the period 2001 to 2006 the
median tier 1 capital ration was with 13.7 % about 10 percentage points above the
regulatory requirement. During the financial crisis it decreased somewhat to 12.5 %
in 2009 and subsequently increased to 15.2 % by 2015. Despite this increase, the
phasing-in of the countercyclical and conservation buffer, starting in 2016, together
with potential systemic capital requirements, will substantially eat into this excess
holdings and may require deleveraging, especially for banks with capital ratios at
the low end of the distribution. Lower leverage reduces return on equity for banks.
This is also suggested by Panel (b) of Figure 4.1. Average return on equity
remained stable at around 15 % for the period after the savings and loan crisis but
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seem to have settled at below 10 % since the financial crisis. While there may be
multiple reasons for this reduction, the higher capital ratios in the period after the
financial crisis, when regulatory capital requirements were raised, are likely to be
one driving factor.
Figure 4.1: Banking regulation
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Notes: Data from Call and Thrift reports for all FDIC–insured institutions from 2001Q1–2015Q4.
Median, 25– and 75–percentile reported. Tier 1 capital ratio computed as common equity Tier 1
capital to total risk–weighted assets. Regulatory requirements reflect phasing–in period. G–SII
requirement includes 1 % systemic and 3.5 % G–SII requirement. Return on equity computed as
net income to average equity.
When return on equity is curtailed by regulation, the incentives for banks to
shift activity away from the regulated market increase. To protect return on equity,
banks can sell risky assets to the less regulated shadow market to reduce
risk-weighted assets against which otherwise regulatory equity would have to be
held (Acharya, Schnabl, and Suarez, 2013). The business model, under which
banks originate loans, not to keep then on balance sheet until maturity (HTM), but
to sell them to a secondary market, is referred to as HTD. The rise of the HTD
model since the late 1980s is well documented. Bord and Santos (2012) show for
syndicated term loans that share of the loan that remained on the book of the lead
bank at credit origination decreased from around 21 % in 1988 to around 8 % in
2010. The fraction of the remaining part, bought by the secondary market,
increased during the same period from 13 % to 56 %. The Joint Forum (2008)
report shows that the fraction of structured finance products that remained on
issuing US banks’ balance sheets was only about one third in 2008, relative to 60 %
in Europe, where the market for structured products less developed.
On the demand side for bank assets is a large shadow banking system
comprising an active and liquid secondary market for bank-originated loans. This
market developed from a volume of $8bn in 1991 to $520bn at the onset of the
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financial crisis. During the crisis, trading volume went down but recovered fast,
such that in 2014 pre-crisis levels were reached again (Figure 4.2, Panel (a)).
Correlated with the growth in secondary market trading was securitization activity.
The issuance of asset-back securities grew strongly since the 1990s and recovered
from the 2010 trough of about $100bn back to $200bn in 2015. The active
secondary market ensures market liquidity for bank-originated loans and facilitates
the determination of opportunity costs of HTM relative to HTD (Pozsar, Adrian,
Ashcraft, and Boesky, 2010).
In total, the shadow market outsizes the traditional banking system (in terms
of total liabilities) in each year since the early 1990s. The rapid growth of the
shadow market only came to a temporary halt in 2007, when the financial crisis
wiped out almost 20 % of shadow liabilities (Figure 4.2, Panel (b)). The crisis hit
the shadow system stronger and more persistently than traditional banks.
However, in 2010, when the trough in shadows liabilities was reached, the shadow
market was still about 10 % larger than the traditional banking sector.
Figure 4.2: Shadow banking system
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4.3 Model
This chapter studies the effect of the presence of a liquid secondary market for
bank-originated loans on bank behavior and on optimal capital regulation. To this
end, it extends a version of the model in Corbae, D’Erasmo, Galaasen, Irarrazabal,
and Siemsen (2015) with bank’s choice to sell loans off balance sheet. The bank can
choose how to allocate resources to HTM and on HTD loans. By selling loans to the
secondary market, the bank reduces monitoring costs for on-balance-sheet loans,
idiosyncratic credit risk exposure and regulatory capital requirements. However,
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since sales are assumed to be with recourse, they also increases bank’s exposure to
aggregate secondary market risk.1 In that sense, by selling loans to the secondary
market, the bank engages in regulatory arbitrage, as it reduces risk-weighted assets
without fully eliminating the risk attached to these assets from its books.
This is not a model of the shadow banking system. Rather, I focus on a
regulated bank’s incentives to sell loans off balance sheet at an endogenously
determined price. The shadow system is therefore as stylized as possible, while
being rich enough to yield a meaningful demand function for secondary market
loans.
The setup is a partial equilibrium model of a single bank’s decision problem.
There are three optimizing agents: a unit mass of ex ante homogeneous borrowers,
a commercial bank and an external market for bank-originated loans, to which I
refer as secondary market. There is also a mass of exogenous institutional investors
to motivate the existence of a secondary market. The bank faces downward–sloping
demand for loan from the primary and secondary market, exogenous deposit
supply, regulatory constraints and exogenous idiosyncratic and aggregate credit
shocks. The secondary market has a pooling technology that allows it to diversify
banks’ idiosyncratic credit risk but not aggregate credit risk and to issue
credit–enhanced asset backed securities (ABS) to institutional investors. In
contrast to banks, the secondary market does not face regulatory constraints.
4.3.1 Environment
Time is discrete, indexed by t and has infinite horizon. Each period t is
dividend into two sub–periods: beginning–of–period (bop) and end–of–period
(eop). The economy is populated by I banks, with I being large. Each bank i ∈ I
operates in its own disjunct niche i, such that there is no strategic interaction
between banks. This, together with the design of the secondary market, allows me
to focus on the dynamic problem of a given bank i in isolation. Banks are exposed
to a niche–specific credit shock ωi, drawn from an aggregate distribution H(ω). ω
is assumed to be iid across niches (banks) and time. In addition, all niches are
exposed to the same aggregate shock zt. Both, the niche– (or bank–) idiosyncratic
shock and the aggregate shock steer the fraction of non–performing loans a bank
and the secondary market face. The aggregate shock, moreover, affects the
operating costs of secondary market’s pooling technology. The bank has market
power in both the primary and secondary loan market. While the model focuses on
a bank’s loan supply choice, it is more stylized concerning bank’s funding choice. In
1Generally, recourse transfers can be explicit and implicit. I model recourse only reduced–form.
Therefore, I remain silent on whether recourse is explicit or implicit and point to Calomiris and
Mason (2004) and Acharya, Schnabl, and Suarez (2013) for further discussion.
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particular, bank’s deposit supply di,t is assumed to be fixed, di,t = di, ∀t. Deposits
are fully insured by an exogenous government sponsored deposit insurance scheme.
Bop states Bank i starts period t with given securities ai,t and aggregate
state zt. Since credit shock ω is iid across time, last periods’ realization is no state
variable. All other optimization problems are static and feature no state variables.
The aggregate state is a three–state Markov process zt ∈ {zG, zB, zD}, with zG
corresponding to normal times, zB is a non–performing loans crisis state and zD is
a state of secondary market distress. All optimizing agents in the model neglect the
risk of secondary market distress, such that they attribute a zero probability of
switching to zD. Let f(zt, zt+1) denote the true transition matrix and let f˜(zt, zt+1)
denote the transition matrix that neglects zD. Then Ef and Ef˜ denote expectations
under f and f˜ , respectively.
Borrower The modeling of borrowers follows Corbae and D’Erasmo (2014)
closely. Each bank niche i is inhabited by a continuum of homogeneous borrowers,
J i, allocated along the unit interval. Borrower j ∈ J i has the possibility to engage
in an investment project that requires one unit of funding. Borrowers have no own
funds and fully rely on bank loans. The investment project is risky as it is exposed
to niche’s credit shock ωi and the aggregate shock: ex–post only a fraction
p(Ri,t, ωi,t+1, zt+1) of investment projects will produce a positive return, while the
remaining projects will produce a loss λ. Besides the exogenous shocks, the success
probability is affected by borrower risk taking Ri,t. I assume that ∂p(·)/∂Ri,t < 0,
i.e. more risk taking reduces success probability. Moreover, ∂p(·)/∂ωi,t+1 > 0 and
∂p(·)/∂zt+1 > 0. The expected gross return of an investment project is1 + zt+1Ri,t , with probability p(Ri,t, ωi,t+1, zt+1)1− λ , with probability 1− p(Ri,t, ωi,t+1, zt+1) .
Borrowers have limited liability, such that in case of project failure, they pay
1− λ to the bank and receive zero. If the project succeeds, they repay the loan at
agreed interest 1 + ri,t, such that its net return is zt+1Ri,t − ri,t. Within a niche
borrowers are ex–ante symmetric and thus face the same loan rate. Borrowers have
an idiosyncratic stochastic outside investment option ιj,t ∼ I(ι) with support [ι, ι¯]
and iid across borrowers. The value of engaging into the risky investment project is
given by
vj(ri,t, zt) = max
Ri,t
Ef˜ω,zt+1|zt [p(Ri,t, ωi,t+1, zt+1)] [zt+1Ri,t − ri,t] , ∀j ∈ J i
Corbae and D’Erasmo (2014) show that under optimal risk taking dR?i,t/dri,t > 0,
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which captures a risk–shifting motive for borrowers under limited liability. A
borrower j will demand a unit loans from bank i if vj(ri,t, zt) ≥ ιj,t. This induces a
downward sloping demand equation for bank i loans
Ld(rLi,t, zt) =
∫ ι¯
ι
I(vj(ri,t, zt) ≥ ιj,t) dI(ι) (4.1)
Institutional investors To motivate the existence of a secondary market
for risky, bank–originated loans, I assume in the background mass ς of
homogeneous and infinitely risk–averse institutional investors with respect to
idiosyncratic uncertainty.2 Investors do not have access to retail deposits and
require a saving technology that caters towards their risk preferences.3 This
technology is provided by the secondary market through the issuance of
credit–enhanced ABS. On its balance sheet, the secondary market transforms risky
bank–originated loans to less risky ABS through a pooling production function,
which diversifies bank–idiosyncratic risk, ω, such that the payoff of the pooled
interest rate stream only depends on ω¯ ≡ Eω.
Secondary market To keep the shadow market as simple as possible, its
problem is designed to be static and additively separable across banks i. Its raison
d’eˆtre is to provide a saving technology to institutional investors that caters towards
their risk preferences. To this end the secondary market engages in loan pooling.4
Let `i,t denote loans bought from bank i. In contrast to banks, the secondary
market is active across all niches i ∈ I, enabling it to operate a production function
F that disentangles the credit risk from the underlying and pools it with credit
risks from all other banks. It then sells access to the credit–enhanced interest
payment stream to investors.
Definition 1 (Pooling Technology). The pooling production function is given
by
F (ω¯) =
I⊕
i=1
(
p(xi,t, ωi,t+1, zt+1)Γi,t
)
≡
I∑
i=1
p(xi,t, ω¯, zt+1)Γi,t , (4.2)
with xi,t some bank–specific determinants of success probability other than ωi,t+1
and Γi,t being cash flow from bank i to the secondary market.
The pooling technology allows the secondary market to disentangle the
idiosyncratic credit risk from the underlying asset and to pool it across all niches,
2Infinite risk aversion can for example be motivated by regulatory requirements on institutional
investors in the secondary market like MMMF. For a similar assumption on investors risk preferences
see Gennaioli, Shleifer, and Vishny (2012, 2013).
3Due to their risk preferences investment in bank equity is not possible.
4To simplify the model I assume for now that the secondary market issues only one tranche.
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such that bank–idiosyncratic risk is equalized and transformed to parametric
distribution average. Consequently, pooling transforms risky loans into a
credit–enhanced asset against which the secondary market issues ABS.
The assumption of such a technology is stylized. However, it facilitates the
model strongly: the framework allows for heterogeneous banks with different bop
security states ai,t, depending on the entire history of ωi realizations.
5
Consequently, also loan supply of banks to the secondary market is not
homogeneous and cash flow depends on the entire distribution of
{p(xi,t, ωi,t+1, zt+1)Γi,t}I . Therefore, the design of the pooling technology enables
aggregation of idiosyncratic credit risk, despite potentially heterogeneous banks,
and allows to consider a single bank’s optimization problem due to additive
separability.6
At bop the secondary market can observe the interest rates {ri,t}I , which it
takes as given. Moreover, it is price taker with respect to the price for bank i
originated loans, qi,t. To finance the purchase of loans from banks, the secondary
market issues asset–backed securities, St, which are bought by investors in
exchange for access to the credit–enhanced interest rate stream. In the absence of
any regulatory constraints on equity, the shadow market is represented by the
following static balance sheet
Assets Liabilities∑
I qi,t`i,t St
Let pit+1 denote secondary market cash flow from pooling technology. There
are no fictions between the secondary market and the investors, such that
secondary market maximizes investors’ expected return from investing into the
credit–enhanced loan pool.7 Let Ψp({`i,t}I , zt, zt+1) denote eop pooling and
operational costs of running the production function F . I assume that
∂Ψp/∂`i,t > 0, ∂
2Ψp/∂`2i,t > 0 and ∂
2ΨP/[∂`i,t∂`j,t] = 0. Moreover, secondary
5Here I only focus on the optimization problem of one bank, abstracting from bank heterogeneity
and strategic interactions among banks.
6An alternative would be to impose an ad–hoc symmetry assumption on the universe of banks.
Under ex–ante homogeneity, averaging interest rate streams implies
1/I
I∑
i=1
p(rt, ωi,t+1, zt+1)[1 + rt]`t = [1 + rt]`t
I∑
i=1
[1/I]p(rt, ωi,t+1, zt+1) = [1 + rt]`tp (rt, ω¯, zt+1)
The last equality requires homogeneity of p(·) in ωi,t+1 of degree one. However, in this case one
would have to impose the assumption of ex–post pooling of banks’ equity, such that at the beginning
of the following period banks are homogeneous again, despite heterogeneous realization of ω, as
policy functions are non–linear in the equity state variable (see Gertler and Kiyotaki, 2010, for this
assumption).
7For a discussion of principal–agent–problem between transaction manager and investors see
European Central Bank (2008).
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market operation costs depend on the aggregate state dynamics (zt, zt+1). I assume
∂Ψp/∂(zt − zt+1) ≤ 0, such that when the aggregate state deteriorates, operating
the pooling technology becomes more costly and recourse transfers in case of
secondary market cash flow shortfall increase. I assume that in the unexpected
secondary market distress state zD, operational and pooling costs increase
substantially, such that Ψp(`i,t, zG, zD) >> Ψ
p(`i,t, zG, zB), ∀`i,t. When choosing
`i,t, secondary market’s objective function is given by
Ef˜zt+1|zt [pit+1] =
Ef˜zt+1|zt
[ I⊕
i=1
({p(ri,t, ωi,t+1, zt+1)[1+ri,t]+[1−p(ri,t, ωi,t+1, zt+1)][1−λ]}`i,t −Ψpi )− St
]
=
Ef˜zt+1|zt
[ I∑
i=1
{p(ri,t, ω¯, zt+1)[1 + ri,t] + (1− p(ri,t, ω¯, zt+1))[1− λ]− qi,t}`i,t −Ψpi }
]
=
Ef˜zt+1|zt
[ I∑
i=1
piit+1(ri,t, ω¯, zt+1)
]
,
where the second equality follows from Equation (4.2) and balance sheet identity.
The last identity shows that secondary market cash flow is additively separable in
the contribution of each bank i such that secondary market demand for `i,t will
only be a function of ri,t but not of other banks’ variables. The interest stream sold
to investors is only exposed to aggregate risk, but perfectly diversified over the
bank–specific shocks. In that sense ABS are (perceived to be) credit–enhanced
relative to risky loans. Secondary market’s static problem is given by
Problem 1 (shadow market problem).
max
{`i,t}I
Ef˜zt+1|zt
[
piit+1
]
s.t.
ri,t, qi,t given
The first order necessary condition is given by
Ef˜z′|z
[
p(ri,t, ω¯, zt+1)[1 + ri,t] + (1− p(ri,t, ω¯, zt+1))[1− λ]− qi,t − ∂Ψ
p
i (·)
∂`i,t
]
= 0, ∀i ∈ I
(4.3)
Equation (4.3) determines optimal demand for loans of bank i on the secondary
market. To understand secondary market loan demand better, we consider the
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total differential of Equation (4.3) with respect to ri,t. Rearranging yields
d`?i,t
dri,t
=
Ef˜zt+1|zt
[
∂p(·)
∂ri,t
[ri,t + λ] + p(·)
]
∂2Ψpi
∂(`?i,t)
2
> 0 ,
i.e. optimal demand for bank i originated loans increases in the agreed on interest
rate. Thereby, the secondary market understands that higher interest loans are also
more risky and trades off the positive effect of higher interest income if the loan is
performing with the reduction in success probability. Since
d`?i,t
dqi,t
= − 1
∂2Ψpi (·)
∂(`?i,t)
2
< 0 ,
convex pooling costs induce a downward sloping loan demand.8
Ex–post, after the realization of zt+1, the underlying loans pay interest and
investors receive the interest stream pit+1. Recourse implies that, if the aggregate
shock turns out to be severe enough such that piit+1(ri,t, ω¯, zt+1) < 0, the sponsoring
bank i has to jump in and put additional cash into the secondary market.
Therefore, recourse transfers τi,t+1 are given by
τi,t+1 =
piit+1(ri,t, ω¯, zt+1), if piit+1(ri,t, ω¯, zt+1) < 00, else (4.4)
Bank The modeling of the bank follows Corbae, D’Erasmo, Galaasen,
Irarrazabal, and Siemsen (2015) closely. To simplify notation I drop the subscript i
where this does not lead to confusion. The bank is risk–neutral and maximize the
present–value stream of dividends
max Ef˜0
[
+∞∑
t=0
βtDt
]
where β is the discount factor of equity holders.
Bank i is restricted to supply loans to niche i, where it has market power in
the sense that it internalizes the effect of its loan supply choice on loan rate. The
bank decides on loan supply, Lt, and security holdings, At, subject to a flow of
funds constraint
8The assumption of convex pooling costs is a shortcut to streamline the secondary market. A
more thorough modeling of the interactions between secondary market and institutional investors’
ABS demand could also induce an interior solution for secondary market loan demand without the
assumption of adjustment costs, e.g. through a market power assumption.
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Constraint 1 (Flow of funds constraint).
at + dt ≥ Lt + At , (4.5)
which states that bop available liquidity, (at + dt), must be sufficient to finance
investment into loans and securities.
Loans Lt have one period maturity such that there is no maturity mismatch.
In contrast to risk–free securities At, which are perpetual and yield a riskless return
ra, loans are exposed to niche–specific credit risk. At eop only a fraction
p(rt, ωt+1, zt+1) of loans is performing, i.e. yields returns. A fraction
(1− p(rt, ωt+1, zt+1)) is non–performing and produces losses of λ. Note that due to
market power, the bank internalizes that Rt = R(rt).
At bop after having decided on the amount of loans to supply, the bank can
sell a fraction αt ∈ [0, 1] to the secondary market at price qt, thereby reducing
risk–weighted assets and thus regulatory capital requirements. Since bank i is the
unique supplier of niche i loans to the secondary market, it has market power in
the secondary loan market, such that it internalizes the downward sloping demand
curve (4.3). By taking a fraction of loans off balance sheet, the bank hides the
credit risk attached to the loans in the shadows. Since the sale is with recourse, the
aggregate credit risk remains in fact on the bank’s book. After the choice of Lt, αt
and At, the bank is captured by the following balance sheet
Assets Liabilities
At dt
(1− αt)Lt
qtαtLt et
and thus equity is defined as
et = At + (1− αt)Lt + qtαtLt − dt (4.6)
The bank is constrained in its portfolio choice by a capital requirement. The
capital requirement is a hard constraint. The implicit assumption is that if the
constraint is violated (which only happens off equilibrium paths), the regulator
steps in and closes the bank down. This induces prohibitively high costs on the
bank, such that the constraint will never be violated on the equilibrium path.9 The
regulatory capital constraint is given by
9An argument in favor of modeling the capital requirement as a hard constraint can be found
in the motivation for the introduction of the conservation and countercyclical buffer under Basel
III. Both give a bank leeway to absorb equity losses before eating into the minimum requirement,
which would trigger sanctions from the regulator (see for example Deutsche Bundesbank, 2011).
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Constraint 2 (Capital Constraint).
ϕ [wL(1− αt)Lt + wAAt] ≤ et , (4.7)
which requires the bank to hold ϕ units of equity for each unit of risk–weighted
assets wL(1− αt)Lt + wAAt, where wL and wA capture regulatory risk weights. The
fraction α of HTD loans is subtracted from risk-weighted assets, since by
assumption the regulator perceives sales to the secondary market as true sales.
After the realization of idiosyncratic, ωt+1, and aggregate, zt+1, credit risk
shocks, bank’s cash flow is given by
ct+1 = {p(rt, ωt+1, zt+1)[1 + rt] + (1− p(rt, ωt+1, zt+1))[1− λ]} (1− αt)Lt
−Ψm (Lt, αt) + raAt + qtαtLt − (1 + rd)dt − τ(rt, qt, zt, zt+1)− κ , (4.8)
where rd and ra are the parametric external deposit and security interest rate,
respectively, and κ captures fixed costs of operating in the loan market. Ψm (Lt, αt)
captures non–interest expenses (e.g. for monitoring) for on–balance–sheet loans.
Selling loans to the secondary market is with recourse. After the realization of
the aggregate shock, any loss in the secondary market due to loans sponsored by
bank i is transfered back onto i’s book through τ(rt, qt, zt, zt+1) (see Equation
(4.4)). The modeling of recourse is parsimonious enough to capture different
mechanisms of recourse (e.g. implicit and explicit recourse) and it is consistent
with two observations in Acharya, Schnabl, and Suarez (2013): first, investors in
secondary market did not suffer much losses during the shadow bank run of 2007
and second, even with the explicit regulatory requirement to sell expected losses to
third parties, in fact the risk still remained with the sponsoring bank as the pricing
of expected loss notes relied on historically very low expected losses.
The bank now decides on its dividend policy, Dt+1. It can distribute the cash
flow to equityholder or retain earnings. Moreover, it has access to a short–run
liquidity market in which it can borrow liquidity at net costs rb. Let Bt+1 < 0
denote retained earnings and Bt+1 > 0 denote short–run borrowing. Then,
dividends are determined as
Dt+1 = ct+1 +Bt+1 (4.9)
The bank is also constrained in its dividend policy:
Constraint 3 (No seasoned equity offerings).
Dt+1 ≥ 0 , (4.10)
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that is, I assume that contemporaneous dividend payments cannot by negative, i.e.
there are no seasoned equity offerings.
Equations (4.9) and (4.10) together imply that if the bank wants to stay in the
market despite negative cash flows, it has to tap the short–term liquidity market
(Bt+1 > 0) to not violate Constraint 3. If, however, the continuation value of
operating in the market is low, the bank may prefer to exit the market. In contrast,
if cash flow is high, the bank may not want to pay everything out as dividends but
rather wants to retain some earnings (Bt+1 < 0) to raise next periods initial
securities at+1. Short–term borrowing requires collateral in form of securities.
Constraint 4 (Collateral Constraint). The gross repayment of short–term
borrowing must not exceed contemporaneous security holdings:
(1 + rb)Bt+1 ≤ At , (4.11)
with rb = 0 if Bt+1 ≤ 0.
If the bank does not have enough securities for covering a negative cash flow, it
is forced to exit the market as Constraint 3 is violated.
At the beginning of period t+ 1, before any choice is made, the short–term
liquidity market clears, i.e. Bt+1 is repaid and principal repayment of performing
loans occurs. Thus, beginning of next periods securities at+1 is given by
at+1 = At − (1 + rb)Bt+1 ≥ 0 (4.12)
Social value of bank Similar to De Nicolo, Gamba, and Lucchetta (2014), I
define the social value of bank i as
Υ(ai,t, zt) = V
f (ai,t, zt) + ςS(ai,t, zt) + T (ai,t, z) , (4.13)
where T (ai,t, zt) captures the present value of expected deposit insurance cost due
to bank default, i.e. T (ai,t, zt) = βgEfz′|z,ω′ [T (ai,t, zt) + T (ai,t+1, zt+1)], with βg
denoting government discount factor and T (ai,t, zt) denoting the instantaneous
costs for the deposit insurance as defined in Equation (4.17) below. Note that
bank’s charter value and deposit insurance costs are computed from a social
planner’s point of view, who internalizes the possibility of secondary market
distress state, zD, according to f .
Υ therefore captures the value of bank i for equity holders through dividend
payments, for investors through providence of a savings technology and for the
government through deposit insurance costs. In contrast to De Nicolo, Gamba, and
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Lucchetta (2014), external funding dt is exogenous and thus not included into Υ.
Also, I exclude short–term borrowing, since B can not be used for productive
intermediation, but only to stabilize dividend payments, which is already captured
in V .
4.3.2 Capital regulation and hold–to–distribute in a static
model
To better understand how capital regulation affects bank’s portfolio choice
between HTD and HTM, consider the following static bank problem, where the
bank only faces the capital constraint, but no non–interest expenses, Ψm, and no
eop choices, i.e. the collateral value of securities and the continuation value is
neglected. Time subscripts are dropped and dependencies on exogenous shocks are
neglected. Let xt = x and xt+1 = x
′ and set (wL, wA) = (1, 0).
V (a, z) = max
L,α,A
Ef˜ω′,z′|z
[
{p(L)[1 + r] + (1− p(L))[1− λ]} (1− α)L
+ qαL+ (1 + ra)A− (1 + rd)d− κ+ τ(L, α)
]
s.t.
a, d given
A+ L ≤ a+ d
e = A+ (1− α)L+ qαL− d
ϕ(1− α)L ≤ e
L = L(r)
αL = `(r, q) ,
where the last two constraints imply market power in the primary and secondary
loan market. This problem can be simplified to
V (a, z) =
max
r,q
Ef˜ω′,z′|z
[ {p(r)[1 + r] + (1− p(r))[1− λ]} [L(r)− `(r, q)]
+ q`(r, q) + (1 + ra)[a+ d− L(r)]− (1 + rd)d− κ+ τ(r, q)]
s.t.
a, d given
ϕL(r) ≤ a+ (q − 1 + ϕ)`(r, q) .
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The first order necessary conditions are given by
(r :) Ef˜ω′,z′|z
[{
∂p
∂r
[r + λ] + p
}
[L− `] + {p[1 + r] + (1− p)[1− λ]}
[
∂L
∂r
− ∂`
∂r
]
+ q
∂`
∂r
− (1 + ra)∂L
∂r
+
∂τ
∂r
− σ
{
ϕ
[
∂L
∂r
− ∂`
∂r
]
+ (1− q)∂`
∂r
}]
= 0 (4.14)
(q :) Ef˜ω′,z′|z
[
−{p[1 + r] + (1− p)[1− λ]} ∂`
∂q
+ q
∂`
∂q
+ `+
∂τ
∂q
− σ
{
−ϕ∂`
∂q
+ (1− q)∂`
∂q
− `
}]
= 0 , (4.15)
where σ denotes the Lagrange multiplier for the capital constraint. Note that
∂τ/∂r = 0 and ∂τ/∂q = 0, as long as expected recourse is zero, i.e. secondary
market cash flow is expected to be non–negative. If expected recourse transfers are
positive, given parameterization, ∂τ/∂r > 0 and ∂τ/∂q < 0, i.e. the (negative)
recourse transfer is decreasing in r and increasing in q. From Equations (4.14) and
(4.15) it follows that market power in the primary and secondary loan market
ensures the existence of an interior solution for L and `.
To understand how capital regulation affects the optimal choices in this
simplified model, I take the total derivative of Equation (4.14), (4.15) with respect
to the capital requirement parameter ϕ. Let SOSC denote the second order
sufficient condition of the respective first order necessary condition, which is
strictly negative. Some manipulations yield
dr
dϕ
=
≤0︷ ︸︸ ︷
σ
[
∂L
∂r
− ∂`
∂r
]
SOSC︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
≥ 0, dq
dϕ
=
≥0︷ ︸︸ ︷
−σ ∂`
∂q
SOSC︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
≤ 0.
In case that the capital constraint is slack (σ = 0), capital regulation has no
implication for optimal behavior. If the capital constraint is binding (σ > 0) an
increase in ϕ raises the interest rate on the primary market and decreases the price
for bank–originated loan on the secondary market. Since
dq/dr = dq/dϕ× (dr/dϕ)−1 < 0, in the static model, tighter capital regulation
reduces bank total loan supply to borrowers and induces a portfolio reallocation
away from HTM towards holds–to–distribute. The driving mechanism is thereby
parsimonious, since it only relies on bank market power in the primary
(∂L/∂r 6= 0) and secondary (∂`/∂q 6= 0) loan market.
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4.3.3 Dynamic program
Let us now turn to the full–fledged dynamic program of the single bank.
Again, time subscripts and bank index are dropped. The value of the bank at the
beginning of the period is given by
Problem 2 (Bop Bank Problem).
V (a, z) = max
L,α,A
β Ef˜ω′,z′|z [W (A,L, α, ω
′, z′)] s.t.
A+ L ≤ a+ d
e = A+ (1− α)L+ qαL− d
ϕ [wL(1− αt)Lt + wAAt] ≤ et
L = L(r, z)
αL = `(r, q, z) ,
where the two last constraint require market clearing on the primary loan market of
niche i and on the secondary market. L(r, z) and `(r, q, z) are given by Equations
(4.1) and (4.3), respectively.
The end–of–period problem is given by
Problem 3 (Eop Bank Problem).
W (A,L, α, ω′, z′) = max
x∈{0,1}
{
W x=1(A,L, α, ω′, z′), W x=0(A,L, α, ω′, z′)
}
,
where the bank chooses between staying in the primary loan market, W x=0, exiting,
W x=1. The exit value is given by
W x=1(A,L, α, ω′, z′) = max
{
0, ξ
[ [
p(r, ω′, z′)[1 + rL] + (1− p(r, ω′, z′))[1− λ]] (1− α)L
+ qαL−Ψm(L, α) + (1 + ra)A
]
(4.16)
− (1 + rd)d− κ+ τ(r, q, z′)
}
,
where the lower bound zero implies limited liability upon exit and ξ is the salvage
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fraction the banks receive from liquidating assets. The continuation value is given by
W x=0(A,L, α, ω′, z′) = max
B′≤ A
1+rb
D′ + V (a′, z′)
s.t.
c′ = [p(r, ω′, z′)[1 + r] + (1− p(r, ω′, z′))[1− λ]] (1− α)L−Ψm (L, α)
+ raA− (1 + rd)d+ qαL− κ+ τ(r, q, z′)
D′ = c′ +B′ ≥ 0
a′ = A− (1 + rb)B′ ≥ 0
Let W˜ x=1 ≡ ξ
[[
p(r, ω′, z′)[1 + rL] + (1− p(r, ω′, z′))[1− λ]] (1− α)L+ qαL−
Ψm(L, α) + (1 + ra)A
]
− κ+ τ(r, q, z′)
}
denote the exit value net of deposit
repayments. Then the expected cost for the deposit insurance at bop conditional
on bank exit is given by
T = Pf
([
W x=1 > W x=0
] ∧ [W˜ x=1 − (1 + rd)dt < 0]) [W˜ x=1 − (1 + rd)d] (4.17)
4.3.4 Information structure and timing
The model has asymmetric information between bank i and corresponding
borrowers about borrower’s outside option {ιi,j,t}j. Optimizing agents do not know
about the presence of secondary market distress state zD and neglect the possibility
of switches to this state. Everything else is perfectly observable. Figure 4.3 make
the timing assumptions from the point of view of bank i explicit.
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Figure 4.3: Timing assumption
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4.4 Calibration
The calibration is preliminary and uses parameters from Corbae and
D’Erasmo (2014). One period in the model corresponds to a year. The bank is
calibrated to an average bank from Call and Thrift reports. All parameters are
2001Q1–2015Q4 averages.
The aggregate shock zt = {zG, zB, zD} is a three state Markov processes, where
zG refers to ’normal times’, zB is a state of high non–performing loans and zD is a
state of secondary market distress. The bank rationally expects transitions from zG
to zB, but neglects the risk of transitions from zG to zD. In the model, zt only
affects non–performing loans and pooling costs Ψp. Since these variables are
calibrated to match empirical moments, the levels of zt states themselves do not
matter. I arbitrarily set zG = 1, zB = zD = 0.969. However, I impose the
assumption that zB = zD. This implies that non-performing loans will be equal in
these two states, of which the bank only expects zB to occur. Therefore, zB and zD
will only differ in the size of the recourse transfer. This allows the bank to
rationally expect high non–performing loans and moderate recourse, while not
expecting the high recourse transfers that occur in zD due to high pooling and
operational costs.
The transition probabilities are calibrated using the maximum likelihood
estimator. Let f(r, s) denote the transition probability from state r to state s,
which is given by the ratio of observed switches from r to s over total state r
observation years (see Barro and Ursua, 2008). Since credit and shadow market
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crises are rare events, I use a panel of OECD countries to calibrate transitions
probabilities. I identify state zB with years in which non–performing loans where
one standard deviation above mean.10 State zD is identified by the LCTM crisis in
1998 in the US and by the initial years of the subprime crisis 2007 and 2008 in
countries with a developed shadow banking sector: the USA, UK and Ireland. The
OECD panel is unbalanced with a maximum range from 1997 to 2015. It has a
total of 611 observed years, including 111 credit crisis years, 7 secondary market
distress years and a residuum of 493 normal times years. In the panel, there are 28
switches from zG to zB, 4 switches from zG to zD, 35 switches from zB to zG and 2
switches from zD to zG. I impose zero restrictions such that the economy cannot
move from zB to zD and vice versa. This approach generates transition matrix
f(zt, zt+1) =
0.935 0.057 0.0080.315 0.685 0
0.286 0 0.714
 ,
with a positive transition probability from zG to zD. This transition matrix is used
to compute the social value of the bank, Υ, as it accounts for the probability of
switching to the secondary market distress state, which induces high recourse
transfers, reduces the charter value, and raises exit probabilities. As discussed in
Section 2.2 optimizing agents neglect the risk of secondary distress. Therefore,
when solving its idiosyncratic dynamic program, it uses the following transition
matrix,
f˜(zt, zt+1) =
0.943 0.057 00.315 0.685 0
0.286 0 0.714
 ,
which features the same probability of leaving normal times and entering a state of
high non–performing loans, but perceives the probability of entering a state of
secondary market distress to be zero. This transition matrix is used when solving
for optimal bank behavior.
The credit–risk shock is assumed to be β–distributed with
H(ω) = B(αβ = 5, ββ = 1). The exogenous deposit supply d is calibrated to match
the average deposit share in the bank’s balance sheet (0.8171).
Similar to Corbae and D’Erasmo (2014), I define success of a borrower’s
investment project as y > 0 with y = ϑ0(ϑ1ω
′ + (z′)ϑ2) + (1− ϑ0)+ ϑ3s− ϑ4Rϑ5 ,
10Source: World Bank, bank nonperforming loans to total gross loans.
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where  ∼ N(0, 1). Therefore,
p(R, s, ω′, z′) = 1− P(y < 0|R, s, ω′, z′) = 1− P
(
 ≤ −ϑ0(ϑ1ω
′ + (z′)ϑ2) + ϑ4Rϑ5
1− ϑ0
)
= Φ
(
ϑ0(ϑ1ω
′ + (z′)ϑ2)− ϑ4Rϑ5
1− ϑ0
)
The parameters (ϑ4, ϑ5, µe, σe) are taken from Corbae and D’Erasmo (2014), while
(ϑ0, ϑ1, ϑ2) are set to match a real annual equity return for the US of 12.9 %
(Diebold and Yilmaz, 2009) and an average annual borrower default frequency of
2 % in z = zG and of 4.5 % in zB and zD.
The idiosyncratic borrower outside option ι is assumed to be distributed
uniformly on [0, 0.227] (Corbae and D’Erasmo, 2014).
Loss–given–default, λ = 0.21, and deposit costs, rd = 0.0086, are set as in
Corbae and D’Erasmo (2014). In this preliminary calibration, I set ra ' rd and
rb = 0.04 to target the ratio of securities over total assets. Fixed costs κ is
calibrated to match average return on equity for the bank. Monitoring costs
Ψm(L, α) are set to c0[(1− α)L]c1 , with c0 = 0.023 and c1 = 2 to target the fraction
of HTD loans over total loans of about one third (The Joint Forum, 2008).
Equityholders’ and social planners discount factor is set to βg = β = 0.95. The
regulatory parameters {ϕ,wL, wA} are set to {0.13, 1, 0}, which implies a 100 % risk
weight on loans to borrowers and a 0 % risk weight on securities.
Finally, the cost structure of the secondary market, Ψp(`, z, z′), is
parameterized to `ε1 + ε2(z
′ − z), with ε1 = 2 to induce convex cost structure. The
Call and Thrift reports show that in the years 2007 and 2008 the maximum
amount of credit exposure arising from recourse or other seller-provided credit
enhancements amounted to 25 % of bank equity.11 ε2 is calibrated to target this
size of recourse transfers (relative to equity) when the economy moves from zG to
zD. Table 4.1 summarizes the preliminary calibration.
11Cross-sectional mean of series RCON B712-718 and RCFD B712-718 relative to cross-sectional
mean equity.
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Table 4.1: Parameter calibration
Parameter Value Target
{zG, zB, zD} aggregate states {1, 0.969, 0.969} normalization
{αβ, ββ} distribution idio. shock {5, 1} –
d deposit supply 0.4316 deposit share
ϑ0 project success prob. 0.68 borrower return/default
ϑ1 weight idio. shock 0.7 borrower return/default
ϑ2 weight agg. shock 5 borrower return/default
ϑ4 risk–taking behavior 3.773 CD
ϑ5 risk–taking behavior 0.784 CD
[ι, ι¯] borrower outside option [0, 0.227] CD
{µe, σe} project distribution {−0.85, 0.10} CD
λ LGD 0.21 CD
rd costs of funds 0.0086 CD
ra security return 1.001× rd security return
rb liquidation costs 0.04 securities/total assets
c0 monitoring costs 0.023 share HTD
c1 monitoring costs 2 convexity
κ fixed cost 7.7× 10−3 return on equity
β, βg discount factor 0.95 CD
ϕ common Tier 1 req. 0.13 Basel III
{wL , wA} risk weights {1, 0} Basel III
ε1 pooling cost parameter 2 convexity
ε2 pooling cost parameter 0.0045 recourse to equity
Notes: CD=Corbae and D’Erasmo (2014).
Table 4.2 shows model–generated moments and their empirical targets. Most
moments are already close to their empirical counterparts, suggesting that the
model can reasonably well capture normal times behavior of an average
FDIC–insured commercial bank.
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Table 4.2: Moments in zG steady state
Variable Definition Model Data Source
borrower return† p(ω′, z′, r?, s?)z′R(r?, s?) 0.127 0.129 CD
loan default† 1− p(ω′, z′, r?, s?) 0.01 0.02 CD
net interest margin† p(ω′, z′, r?, s?)r? − rd 0.047 0.047 CD
HTD/total loans† `?/L? 0.36 1/3 JF
RoE† [D′ + a′ − e]/e 0.069 0.078 CT
loans/Assets† L?/(L? + A?) 0.95 0.55 CD
external funding share† d/(L? + A?) 0.82 0.82 CT
core capital ratio e?/(wL[L
? − `?] + wAA?) 0.130 0.128 CT
Notes: † targeted moments. All moments correspond to the stochastic z = zG
steady state. CD=Corbae and D’Erasmo (2014); CT=Call & Thrift report
moments 2001Q4-2015Q4; JF=The Joint Forum (2008)
4.5 Quantitative results
4.5.1 Decision rules
This section shows optimal equilibrium behavior of borrowers’ and the bank.
Figure 4.4 shows borrowers’ loan demand (Panel (a)) and risk taking behavior
(Panel (b)) as a function of the loan interest rate charged by the bank, as well as
implied project success probability as a function of the idiosyncratic credit shock, ω
(Panel (c)). Loan demand is decreasing in the interest rate. Loan demand in the
non–performing loans crisis state, zB, is on average 28 % below loan demand in the
normal state, zG. Loan demand in state zD slightly deviates from demand in zB,
although the states are identical from the borrowers’ point of view, as the
persistence of the two states is different. This affects expected project returns and
thus loan demand. Due to the risk shifting motive, risk taking is increasing in the
loan rate, such that expected project success is decreasing (Panel (d)).
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Figure 4.4: Borrower policy functions
0 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.08
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
r
L
(a) Loan demand
L(zG)
L(zB)
L(zD)
0 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.08
0.11
0.115
0.12
0.125
0.13
r
R
(b) Risk taking
R(zG)
R(zB)
R(zD)
0.75 0.8 0.85 0.9 0.95 1
0
0.5
1
ω
p
(c) Ex-post success probability
β tr(5,1) cdf
p(zG, [rmin , rmax ])
p(zB , [rmin , rmax ])
p(zD, [rmin , rmax ])
0 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
r
E
[p
]
(d) Expected success probability
E[p(zG)]
E[p(zB)]
E[p(zD)]
Figures 4.5 to 4.7 show bop and eop policy functions for the bank decisions.
The presence of the secondary market allows the bank to reduce risk-weighted
assets (RWA) by selling loans. Measuring bank size by state a, Figure 4.5(b) shows
that for small banks (a ≤ 0.037) the capital constraint is binding, i.e. the bank
would like to increase the fraction of HTM loans, but has not enough risk bearing
capacity. This implies that small banks, with lower equity, engage more strongly in
secondary market activities to reach the interior optimum for primary market loan
supply. This is in line with the empirical evidence in Acharya, Schnabl, and Suarez
(2013). As bank size increases, the higher risk–bearing capacity allows the bank to
raise RWA by reducing the fraction of HTD loans. Since the bank has market
power in the primary loan market, there is an interior optimum for
on–balance–sheet loans.12 Therefore, once the bank has accumulated enough
equity, the capital constraint ceases being binding as the interior optimum for RWA
is reached. Further increases in bank size increase the fraction of HTD loans again,
12Note that given the calibration of risk weights, (wL, wA) = (1, 0), HTM loans are equal to
RWA.
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as, to keep RWA constant, the bank has to sell a larger fraction of the further
increasing loan supply to borrowers.
Figure 4.5: Bank policy functions: beginning of period
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Figure 4.6 shows expected return for HTM and HTD for bank-perceived
transition probabilities (Panel (a)), which neglect the risk of secondary market
distress, and for transition probabilities including secondary market fragility (Panel
(b)). With secondary market fragility, the expected return for HTM is reduced by
about 9 %, relative to a stable secondary market, due to the possibility of
secondary market distress and the corresponding reduction in zG persistence. In
contrast, expected return for HTD is reduced on average by 26 % due to
substantially higher recourse transfers with fragility. Under bank-perceived
transition probabilities the binding capital constraint for small banks (a ≤ 0.037)
induces return for HTM to be above return for HTD, as returns cannot be
equalized through portfolio reallocation.
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Figure 4.6: Bank policy functions: returns in zG
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Figure 4.7 shows the policy functions for eop bank decisions. In panels (a)–(c)
the solid lines corresponds to policy functions conditional on the realization for the
idiosyncratic credit shock of ω′ = Eω. Dashed and ragged line correspond to the
policy function conditional on the realization of minimum and maximum ω′,
respectively. If eop the economy is in the normal times state, the realization of ω′
has little effects on bank’s eop decisions. The bank never exits, cash flow is always
non–negative and recourse transfers are zero. If the economy switches from zG to
zB or zD at eop, the effect of the idiosyncratic credit shock is much more
pronounced. For a small bank cash flow is always negative and the likelihood of
exit is high. As bank size increases the bank raises its share of securities in the
portfolio and thus cash flow becomes less exposed to the idiosyncratic credit shock.
This reduces the likelihood of exit. Panel (d) shows policy functions for recourse
transfers. If the economy switches from zG to zB at eop, the bank faces recourse
transfers that are internalized in optimal behavior. If the economy switches to zD
eop, recourse is larger throughout the entire state space and can wipe out small
bank’s entire equity. Note that recourse transfers do not depend on the realization
of ω′ since the secondary market diversifies over bank-idiosyncratic credit shocks.
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Figure 4.7: Bank policy functions: end of period
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Notes: Solid line in Panels (a)–(c) corresponds to policy functions conditional on the realization of
ω′ = Eω. Dashed and ragged line correspond to the policy function conditional on the realization
minimum and maximum ω′, respectively.
4.5.2 Secondary market presence
To better understand how the introduction of the secondary market to the
model affects bank behavior, I consider a version of the model without a secondary
market for bank–originated loans. In this version, the bank is deprived of the
possibility to disentangle primary market loan supply from its risk–bearing
capacity, such that loan supply to borrowers can be constrained by equity. This is
shown in Figure 4.8(a) for the normal times state, zG. With a secondary market,
primary market loan supply is only weakly increasing in bank equity, as risk
bearing capacity is only relevant for HTM loans, but not for total loan supply. In
contrast, without a secondary market, bank’s ability to supply loans to the primary
market is directly affected by risk–bearing capital. On average, the unconstrained
optimal loan supply is 3.5 % below loan supply in the version with secondary
market. The reason is that return on HTM is lower, since the bank cannot
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economize on monitoring costs through loan sales.
Panel (b) shows the policy function for risk–weighted assets. With a secondary
market the capital constraint does not affect primary market loan supply, but it is
still relevant for the bank. Bank’s market power induces an interior optimum for
HTM loans (equal to RWA). Therefore, also with a secondary market the capital
constrained can be binding. With low equity, the bank is constrained to sell a
larger fraction of its loans to reduce RWA sufficiently in order to reach the interior
optimal primary market loan supply. An important consequence is that capital
regulation can induce a bank with low equity to engage in more regulatory
arbitrage, relative to an unconstrained bank. With a fragile secondary market, this
can be detrimental to bank stability, as is discussed in Section 4.5.3.
Panel (c) shows bank’s eop exit probability for bop state zG. With a stable
secondary market and no unexpected recourse transfers (p(zG → zD) = 0) the exit
probability is below the probability under a fragile secondary market
(p(zG → zD) > 0), as it is perceived by the bank. As bank’s equity increases
together with bank size, the exit probability goes down. When comparing the exit
probabilities to the version where the bank has no access to a secondary market,
two results are important: first, the presence of a secondary market (even if fragile)
allows a small bank to operate in the primary loan market, since, despite low
risk–bearing capacity, it can supply sufficient loans to borrowers to cover
(exogenous) deposit expenses and fixed costs (see Equation (4.8)). Without a
secondary market, the bank is forced to invest most bop liquidity into safe
securities, which, given calibration, do not generate enough returns (ra ' rd) to
cover eop expenses and to accumulate equity, such that the capital constraint next
period can be eased. In this situation the small bank cannot operate cost efficiently
in the market and prefers to exit, which can be seen by a 100 % exit probability.
Again, this is in line with empirical evidence that banks with low equity engage
more strongly in regulatory arbitrage (Acharya, Schnabl, and Suarez, 2013).
Second, for a large enough bank, the exit probability without secondary market
always lies between the exit probabilities with secondary market. If the secondary
market works smoothly and there is a zero probability of distress, the presence of
the secondary market increases bank stability, as selling loans reduces bank’s
exposure to the idiosyncratic credit shock. However, if the secondary market is
fragile, the unexpected recourse transfers offset this positive effect and exit
probability is higher than without a secondary market.
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Figure 4.8: Effect of secondary market on portfolio allocation
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4.5.3 Capital regulation under regulatory arbitrage
We now turn to the core question how capital regulation affects bank’s
incentives to engage in regulatory arbitrage and its social value. To this end, we
keep the calibration from Section 4.4 unchanged, except for the capital requirement
ϕ and focus on bop normal times state, zG, from which zB and zD can be reached
eop. Figure 4.9 shows bank’s social value, as defined in Equation (4.13), over
different capital requirements, once for a stable secondary market (p(zG → zD) = 0)
and once with fragility (p(zG → zD) > 0).
Two results are important, first, the social value is non-monotonic in ϕ. For
ϕ < 0.13, social value is increasing in ϕ, reaches is global maximum at ϕ = 0.13,
decreases up to ϕ = 0.17 and then falls over a cliff. For ϕ > 0.17, Υ drops below
the value of an unregulated bank (ϕ = 0). The figure also suggests that regulators
may prefer to err on the regulatory region to the left of the global optimum, since
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marginal costs of having a too high requirement in place (relative to ϕ = 0.13) is
higher than the marginal cost of a too low requirement. Second, secondary market
fragility induces a downward shift in bank’s social value. However, the optimal
capital requirement (in zG stochastic equilibrium) is the same with and without
secondary market fragility. The reason is that bop bank behavior in zG is identical.
In both cases, the bank does not anticipate the possibility of switches to zD. But
under p(zG → zD) > 0 it may end up in zD at eop facing unexpected high recourse
transfers, which reduce charter value and increase deposit insurance costs. Thus,
the gap in social value between the two regimes is increasing (although only
slightly) in the fraction of HTD loans (α) as it increases bank’s exposure to
secondary market distress. This effect does, however, not induce different socially
optimal levels of capital regulation. At the global optimum, social value without
fragility is 46 % higher than social value with fragility.
Figure 4.9: Capital regulation and social value
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Notes: Values correspond to stochastic steady state for zt = zG, ∀t. The dot marks capital
requirement that induce maximum social bank value.
To better understand these dynamics, Figure 4.10 decomposes Υ into its main
components. Panels (a) and (c) show that fragility induces parallel shifts in both
bank’s charter value and present value deposit insurance costs in zG. The
possibility of secondary market distress raises probability-weighted eop recourse
transfers, which lowers the charter value, and raises the exit probability, which
increases deposit costs. For a capital requirement of ϕ > 0.17, both charter value
and insurance costs change dramatically. With secondary market fragility, the
charter value drops by 27 %, while deposit insurance costs increase by 43 %. This
translates to the reduction in social value.
The reason can be found in Panels (d) and (e). The fraction of HTD loans
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increases together with ϕ, since increasing regulatory pressure decreases return
investment into bank equity (Panel b).13 At ϕ = 0.1, the fraction of HTD loans
reaches a plateau at 26 % where it remains as long as ϕ ≤ 13 %. For
13 % < ϕ ≤ 17 % the fraction of HTD loans increases in ϕ again but steeper as
before. For ϕ > 0.17, the bank finds it optimal to engage massively in regulatory
arbitrage, as sales to the secondary market jump discretely from 40 % to about
80 %. This allows the bank to decrease equity by 59 %. Therefore, the model
suggests that with the possibility for the bank to engage in regulatory arbitrage,
the effect of capital regulation on a bank’s social value is non-monotonic: for a
sufficiently low capital requirement (ϕ ≤ 0.13), increases in ϕ lead to higher bank
equity holdings that increase charter value and lead to lower exit probability and
deposit insurance costs in case of a non–performing loans crisis or secondary
market distress. However, ϕ > 17 % induces evasive behavior, as the bank finds it
optimal to move a large fraction of its loans into the shadows to protect return on
equity. Even with a stable secondary market (p(zG → zD) = 0) this drop in equity
reduces bank stability. Therefore, in the presence of a secondary market for
bank–originated loans that induces the possibility for regulatory arbitrage, the
model speaks in favor of a capital requirement in the region of 13 %.
13The charter value measures the present value discounted sum of dividends over the lifetime
of the bank. Therefore, the present value expected return for an investors who invests e units of
equity into the bank is given by V/e.
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Figure 4.10: Social value components in zG
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These results are suggestive for the view that for systemically important
institutions, the accumulated capital requirements suggested under Basel III
(minimum, conservation, counter-cyclical, GSIB), may lie close to the evasive
region (see Figure 4.1). The benefits of a further tightening in capital regulation
could then be offset by an increase in regulatory arbitrage, which raises exposures
to uncovered aggregate risk. This trade-off between secondary market risk exposure
and higher risk-bearing capacity should not be neglected by regulators, since the
consequences for deposit insurance costs and bank’s equity cushion are
economically significant.
4.6 Conclusion
This chapter develops a simple quantitative framework to study the effect of
capital regulation on a bank’s social value if the bank can engage in regulatory
arbitrage. In this framework the bank neglects the risk of secondary market
distress, as it perceives pooled loans to be substitutes for safe assets. However, the
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secondary market is exposed to an aggregate shock that may induce the pooling
technology to work only at high costs. This harbors the possibility of unexpected
high recourse transfers from the sponsoring bank to the secondary market.
Therefore, regulatory arbitrage exposes the bank to aggregate risk that is
uncovered by equity under optimal bank behavior.
The possibility to sell loans to the secondary market induces non-monotonicity
on the dependency between capital regulation and social value. Tighter regulation
increases bank equity and reduces exit probability, and thus deposit insurance
costs, while also inducing the bank to sell more loans to protect return on equity.
This increases bank’s exposure to systemic secondary market distress and reduces
bank stability. For capital requirements below 14 % the model suggests that the
stabilizing effect outweighs the additional exposure to aggregate risk due to
recourse, as the fraction of HTD loans increases moderately from 0 % to 26 %.
Therefore, the social value is increasing in ϕ for ϕ ≤ 13 %. For a capital
requirement above 13 %, the social value of the bank is decreasing in the
requirement, as the fraction of sold-off loans increases more strongly, reducing
equity, charter value and raising insurance costs. Crucially, for a capital
requirement above 17 % the fraction of HTD loans jumps from 40 % to 80 %. The
simultaneous reduction of equity and increase in exposure to uncovered aggregate
risk reduces bank stability and increases deposit insurance costs, such that the
social value of the bank is reduced below that of an unregulated bank. Therefore,
given the calibration, in the presence of a secondary market for regulatory
arbitrage, the model suggests an idiosyncratic minimum capital requirement in the
region of 13 %, but below 17 %, for the average FDIC-insured bank.
Keys, Mukherjee, Seru, and Vig (2008) and Mian and Sufi (2009) document
for the recent financial crisis that the possibility to sell risky assets to the
secondary market for securitization reduces banks’ screening incentives. If
borrowers’ idiosyncratic risk is iid, this behavior does not increase systemic risk, as
it is diversified by loan pooling. However, as the years 2007 and 2008 have shown,
if borrowers’ risk is correlated, loose screening standards increase systemic risk in
the secondary market, which may boomerang back on banks’ books. The model
currently remains silent on the quantitative effect of capital regulation on a bank’s
social value if the bank can optimally choose screening effort. Adding this
mechanism to the model will leave qualitative result unchanged but will impact the
quantitative implications. If the bank has to choose costly screening intensity
before deciding which fraction of the loan to sell and if the secondary market has no
valuation for screening, as it can diversify borrower idiosyncratic risk, the screening
incentive decreases, the more loans the banks sells to the secondary market. In this
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setting, the negative effect of regulatory arbitrage on bank’s social value is amplified
if little screened loans increase recourse transfers during secondary market distress.
In this case the region of optimal minimum capital regulation derived in this paper
can be seen as an upper bound relative to a framework with endogenous screening.
The implementation of screening into the model is left for future research.
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